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Abstract:	 Fiscal	 rules	have	become	popular	 to	 limit	 deficits	 and	high	debt	burdens	 in	
industrialized	countries.	A	growing	literature	examines	their	impact	based	on	aggregate	
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tations	of	 fiscal	policy	makers.	 In	 the	context	of	 the	German	debt	brake,	we	study	 this	
expectation	dimension.	In	a	first	step,	we	introduce	a	simple	dynamic	model	in	an	envi‐
ronment	characterized	by	the	lagged	implementation	of	a	new	rule.	Lagged	implementa‐
tion	characterizes	the	setup	of	the	German	debt	brake	and	raises	credibility	issues.	In	a	
second	step,	we	analyze	a	unique	survey	of	members	of	all	16	German	state	parliaments	
and	show	that	the	debt	brake’s	credibility	is	far	from	perfect.	The	heterogeneity	of	com‐
pliance	 expectations	 in	 the	 survey	 closely	 corresponds	 to	 our	 theoretical	 predictions	
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opposition	 dimension),	which	we	 attribute	 to	 overconfidence	 rather	 than	 noisy	 infor‐
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	JEL	Classification	Code:	H6,	H7	
	
Keywords:		Budget	Deficits,	Debt	Brake,	Credibility,	Survey,	Fiscal	Rules	
 
Acknowledgement: The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the Collaborative Research 
Center (SFB) 884 “Political Economy of Reforms”, funded by the German Research Foundation 
(DFG).	
	
*	Corresponding	author:	
Eckhard	Janeba,	Department	of	Economics,	University	of	Mannheim,	L7,	3‐5,	68131	
Mannheim,	Germany,	++49‐621‐181	1795,	janeba@uni‐mannheim.de.	
	
1 
 
1.	Introduction	
	
Constitutional	 fiscal	 rules	 such	 as	 a	 balanced	 budget	 requirement	 have	 been	 used	 for	
decades	in	federal	countries	such	as	Switzerland	and	the	US	states	to	limit	deficits	and	
debts	of	sub‐national	jurisdictions	(for	a	survey	of	current	fiscal	rules	see	IMF,	2012).	On	
the	national	 level,	 the	euro	area	debt	crisis	has	 triggered	a	wave	of	new	statutory	and	
constitutional	budget	constraints	in	order	to	boost	public	borrower	reputation.	The	Fis‐
cal	Compact,	accepted	by	all	EU	countries	except	the	UK	and	the	Czech	Republic	in	2012,	
has	been	another	milestone	for	the	spread	of	numerical	fiscal	constraints.	The	signatory	
countries	commit	to	the	introduction	of	national	debt	brakes	with	well‐defined	numeri‐
cal	contents	(i.e.	governments	are	required	to	limit	structural	deficits	to	a	maximum	of	
0.5%	of	GDP,	and	to	lower	debt	levels	systematically	when	exceeding	60%	of	GDP,	Euro‐
pean	Council,	2011).		
A	growing	 literature	examines	the	 impact	of	numerical	 fiscal	rules	based	on	aggregate	
fiscal	performance	in	different	regional	contexts.	The	standard	approach	is	the	estima‐
tion	of	 cross‐section	or	panel	models	 for	 the	 selected	 jurisdictions	and	 their	deficit	or	
debt	performance	 (for	 the	US	 see	Eichengreen	and	Bayoumi,	1994,	Poterba,	1996;	 for	
Europe	 see	Debrun,	2000,	Lagona	and	Padovano,	2007,	Debrun	et	 al.,	 2008;	 for	OECD	
countries	see	Dahan	and	Strawczynski,	2010;	and	for	Swiss	cantons	and	municipalities	
see	 Feld	 and	Kirchgässner,	 2008;	Krogstrup	 and	Wälti,	 2008).	A	 shortcoming	of	 these	
highly	aggregated	approaches	is	that	they	do	not	reveal	how	fiscal	rules	impact	on	the	
beliefs	 of	 fiscal	 decision	makers	 regarding	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 fiscal	 rule	 and	 hence	
their	expectations	for	compliance.	The	present	paper	aims	to	fill	this	hole	by	examining	
theoretically	and	empirically	the	intermediate	step	between	fiscal	rules	on	the	one	hand	
and	decision	makers’	expectations	on	future	fiscal	outcomes	on	the	other	hand.	
A	defining	characteristic	of	an	effective	and	credible	rule	is	that	it	anchors	expectations	
consistent	 with	 the	 rule’s	 constraints.	 This	 logic	 has	 long	 been	 the	 key	 for	 assessing	
monetary	rules.	 In	 the	monetary	context,	 incentives	to	generate	surprise	 inflation	may	
undermine	 the	 credibility	 of	 an	 inflation	 rule	 (Kydland	 and	Prescott,	 1977;	Barro	 and	
Gordon,	1983).	Hence,	a	monetary	rule’s	effectiveness	can	be	assessed	by	analyzing	its	
impact	on	inflationary	expectations.	For	fiscal	policy,	an	analogy	applies	for	a	deficit	rule	
and	its	impact	on	compliance	expectations.	Due	to	the	political	costs	of	fiscal	consolida‐
tion,	 politicians	may	 face	 incentives	 not	 to	 comply	with	 the	 deficit	 rule	 in	 the	 future.	
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Whether	and	to	what	extent	the	new	rule	is	seen	as	a	binding	constraint	should	be	de‐
tectable	 from	compliance	 expectations.	This	 should	hold	 in	particular	 for	 the	 expecta‐
tions	of	those	political	actors	who	take	the	relevant	budgetary	decisions.	Therefore,	the	
impact	of	fiscal	rules	on	politicians’	expectations	offers	a	natural	way	to	assess	the	cred‐
ibility	and	effectiveness	of	a	new	rule‐based	fiscal	regime.	
Although	the	underlying	 idea	 is	of	obvious	and	fundamental	 importance,	our	contribu‐
tion	is	the	first	to	study	through	a	survey	of	politicians	to	what	extent	policy	makers	ex‐
pect	compliance	with	a	new	fiscal	rule.	Thus,	it	serves	to	fill	a	striking	gap	in	the	litera‐
ture	on	fiscal	rules’	effectiveness.	The	approach	has	a	further	strength:	While	studies	on	
the	 link	between	rules	and	observable	 fiscal	performance	are	only	applicable	on	an	ex	
post‐basis	(i.e.	after	many	years	of	experience	with	an	existing	rule)	our	method	can	be	
employed	ex	ante	(i.e.	once	a	rule	has	come	into	existence	but	performance	data	are	not	
yet	available).	Furthermore,	it	opens	the	black	box	of	aggregation	and,	instead,	looks	into	
the	impact	of	a	fiscal	rule	on	the	(heterogeneous)	expectations	of	those	individual	politi‐
cians	who	actually	take	the	budgetary	decisions.	
The	institutional	context	of	our	analysis	is	the	German	debt	brake.	We	explore	expecta‐
tion	 formation	 for	 the	members	of	 all	German	 state	parliaments	 regarding	an	existing	
fiscal	 rule	 that	 becomes	 binding	 only	 several	 years	 from	 now.	 The	 case	 of	 Germany’s	
debt	brake	is	of	interest	for	the	understanding	of	fiscal	rules	more	generally	and	beyond	
Germany:	First,	the	German	government	has	been	a	major	advocate	for	establishing	the	
Fiscal	Compact	in	Europe.	In	fact,	in	many	dimensions	the	provisions	of	the	Fiscal	Com‐
pact	are	 similar	 to	 that	of	Germany’s	debt	brake.	Therefore,	a	better	understanding	of	
the	German	debt	brake	will	also	be	helpful	for	assessing	the	Compact’s	consequences	for	
other	 EU	 countries.	 Second,	 the	 German	 debt	 brake	 is	 characterized	 by	 lagged	 imple‐
mentation	since	its	binding	constraints	are	phased	in	over	a	longer	period	(for	the	cen‐
tral	level	until	the	year	2016	and	for	the	state	level	in	2020).	Lagged	implementation	is	a	
frequent	strategy	to	realize	far	reaching	institutional	reforms	since	it	helps	to	overcome	
reform	resistance	(see	Buchanan,	1994,	for	a	general	discussion).	At	the	same	time,	the	
transition	 process	 raises	 substantial	 credibility	 questions	 and	 the	 German	 debt	 brake	
example	offers	the	opportunity	to	better	understand	the	general	conditions	under	which	
lagged	implementation	can	nevertheless	be	credible.	
Our	analysis	of	expectation	formation	comprises	a	theoretical	and	an	empirical	contribu‐
tion.	First	we	develop	a	theoretical	model	with	three	periods	(labelled	0,	1,	2)	describing	
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the	dynamic	 fiscal	 decision	 situation	 in	 an	 environment	 characterized	by	phasing	 in	 a	
zero	deficit	 rule.	Decisions	on	deficits	 are	dynamic	by	nature	and	 imply	 trade‐offs	be‐
tween	 instant	and	 future	political	costs	 from	fiscal	consolidation.	The	model’s	key	 fea‐
ture	is	the	existence	of	a	fiscal	rule	which	takes	effect	only	in	the	future	(period	2).	A	fis‐
cal	shock	in	the	near	future	(period	1)	makes	compliance	with	the	fiscal	rule	uncertain	
when	the	fiscal	rule	is	not	credible.	In	period	1,	the	government	trades	off	the	benefits	
and	costs	of	adhering	to	the	fiscal	rule.	Compliance	is	more	likely	the	lower	is	the	initial	
deficit	 in	period	0	 ,	 the	higher	 is	the	government’s	competence	 in	smoothing	the	 fiscal	
shock	,	the	lower	are	bailout	expectations	,	the	tighter	is	a	fiscal	rule	at	the	state	level	in	
period	1,	and	the	higher	 the	deficit	 reduction	 in	period	0.	The	model	also	allows	us	 to	
consider	 noisy	 information	 about	 a	 government’s	 ability	 and	 overconfidence	with	 re‐
spect	to	compliance	with	the	fiscal	rule,	which	can	explain	heterogeneous	beliefs	of	poli‐
ticians.	The	model	thus	captures	key	features	of	the	German	debt	rule	as	well	as	similar	
institutional	innovations	elsewhere	and	guides	the	empirical	analysis.	
In	a	second	step,	we	test	these	model	predictions	on	the	drivers	of	compliance	expecta‐
tions	 based	 on	 a	 unique	 survey	 of	members	 of	 all	 16	 German	 state	 parliaments,	who	
have	been	contacted	with	a	questionnaire	relating	to	the	new	debt	brake.	In	the	survey	
we	elicited	responses	for	the	politicians’	expectations	on	the	own	state	complying	with	
the	 new	 rule	 by	 the	 year	 2020,	 on	 other	 states’	 compliance,	 and	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	
sanctions	or	bailout	 if	 a	 state	 violates	 the	new	rule	 in	2020.	 Since	 the	 survey	was	not	
anonymous,	 individual	characteristics	 (such	as	education,	party	membership,	etc.)	and	
state	characteristics	(such	as	current	fiscal	position	and	future	need	for	fiscal	consolida‐
tion)	can	be	used	to	systematically	study	the	determinants	of	compliance	expectations.	
The	survey	shows	that	the	debt	brake’s	credibility	is	far	from	perfect.		The	heterogeneity	
of	compliance	expectations	in	the	survey	closely	corresponds	to	our	theoretical	predic‐
tions.	 States’	 initial	 fiscal	 conditions,	 specific	 state	 fiscal	 rules	 and	bailout	 perceptions	
matter.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 a	 robust	 asymmetry	 in	 compliance	 expectations	 between	
insiders	and	outsiders	(both	for	in‐state	versus	out‐of‐state	politicians	and	the	govern‐
ment	 versus	 opposition	 dimension).	 Insiders	 tend	 to	 be	 significantly	 more	 optimistic	
than	outsiders	regarding	the	likelihood	of	state’s	compliance.	Based	on	the	guidance	of	
our	 theoretical	 model	 we	 diagnose	 overconfidence	 of	 insiders	 (and	 not	 noisy	 infor‐
mation)	as	driving	this	asymmetry.	These	detailed	insights	improve	our	understanding	
on	how	the	credibility	of	a	new	national	fiscal	rule	can	be	strengthened	in	general.	Our	
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results	point	 to	 the	 importance	of	no‐bailout	 rules,	 sustainable	 initial	 fiscal	 conditions	
and	complementary	sub‐national	rules.	
Our	paper	is	related	to	various	other	literatures.	A	few	recent	papers	analyze	theoreti‐
cally	 the	 role	 of	 fiscal	 rules	 in	 a	 political	 economy	 framework,	 such	 as	 Azzimonti,	
Battaglini	and	Coate	(2008).	Janeba	(2012)	considers	the	role	of	delay	in	making	a	Ger‐
man	 type	 debt	 brake	 binding	when	 the	 fiscal	 rule	 itself	 is	 credible.	 The	 incentives	 of	
bailouts	in	a	federal	context	are	considered	by	Goodspeed	(2002).	Kirchgässner	(2002)	
and	Voigt	and	Blume	(2011)	examine	empirically	the	effects	of	fiscal	constraints	on	fiscal	
outcomes.	Expectation	effects	of	fiscal	rules	with	respect	to	bond	market	investors	play	a	
role	for	studies	which	look	into	the	impact	of	fiscal	rules	on	risk	premia	of	government	
bonds	 (Heinemann,	Osterloh	 and	Kalb,	 2014;	 Iara	 and	Wolff,	 2014).	 Surveys	 of	 politi‐
cians	have	been	used	in	recent	research	by	two	of	the	present	authors.	Heinemann	and	
Janeba	(2011)	use	a	survey	of	members	of	Germany’s	national	parliament	to	study	ideo‐
logical	bias	in	tax	policy.	Janeba	and	Osterloh	(2013)	use	a	survey	of	mayors	in	the	Ger‐
man	state	of	Baden‐Württemberg	 to	empirically	motivate	 the	spatial	 structure	of	 local	
tax	competition	in	a	theoretical	tax	competition	model.	Heinemann	and	Osterloh	(2013)	
survey	members	of	the	European	Parliament	regarding	the	introduction	of	a	minimum	
tax	for	companies	in	the	EU	in	order	to	disentangle	ideological	and	national	preferences	
of	politicians.	
The	rest	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	sets	up	the	theoretical	model	and	
derives	comparative	statics	for	the	likelihood	of	compliance	with	the	debt	brake.	Section	
3	describes	our	original	survey	and	provides	background	information	on	Germany’s	po‐
litical	 and	 fiscal	 system	and	 the	debt	brake.	Our	main	 findings	 are	presented	 and	dis‐
cussed	in	section	4.	Finally,	section	5	concludes.	
	
2.		A	Model	of	Fiscal	Rule	Compliance		
We	model	the	dynamic	fiscal	decision	of	an	incumbent	government	to	reduce	its	deficit	
in	order	to	meet	the	target	of	a	fiscal	rule	becoming	effective	only	in	the	distant	future.	
Political	costs	of	deficit	reduction	are	modeled	in	a	reduced	form	in	order	to	focus	on	the	
likelihood	of	compliance	with	the	fiscal	rule.	Lack	of	government	commitment	and	defi‐
cit	shocks	make	compliance	non‐trivial	and	uncertain.	Specifically,	we	assume	that	 the	
economy	lasts	 for	 three	periods,	ݐ ൌ 0,1,2.	The	main	variable	of	 interest	 is	 the	govern‐
ment	deficit	݀௧.	The	initial	deficit	is	given	by	݀଴ ൐ 0	and	is	exogenous	from	the	viewpoint	
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of	the	incumbent	government	in	period	0.	The	fiscal	rule	(i.e.,	the	debt	brake)	requires	
the	government	to	run	a	balanced	budget	in	period	2.	If	this	target	is	met	(that	is,	݀ଶ ൑
0),	 the	government	obtains	payoff	ݑ௖	 (c	 for	compliance).	Otherwise	 the	government	 is	
noncompliant	 and	obtains	 payoff	 ݑ௡௖.	We	define	ݑ ൌ ݑ௖ െ ݑ௡௖	 	 as	 the	 gross	 gain	 from	
compliance.	This	dynamic	set‐up	corresponds	to	the	lagged	implementation	of	the	Ger‐
man	debt	brake.	Periods	0	and	1	represent	the	time	 in	which	the	debt	brake	has	been	
implemented	but	not	yet	taken	effect.	Period	2,	from	the	perspective	of	German	states,	
would	be	the	year	2020	in	which	the	zero	deficit	limit	for	the	German	states	enters	into	
force.		
The	government	can	reduce	the	deficit	in	two	steps	toward	the	goal	by	reducing	the	def‐
icit	in	periods	0	and	1	by	the	amounts	ݎ଴ ൒ 0	and	ݎଵ ൒ 0,	respectively.	We	model	deficit	
reduction	in	a	reduced	form	without	specifying	the	nature	of	the	fiscal	adjustment	(i.e.,	
tax	increases	and/or	expenditure	cuts).	Deficit	reduction	is	costly	for	the	government	in	
the	period	when	it	takes	place	because	approval	ratings	of	the	government	or	reelection	
chances	are	harmed.	We	focus	on	the	concurrent	cost	even	though	the	cost	of	permanent	
deficit	reduction	may	spill	over	to	future	periods.	We	thus	implicitly	assume	that	voters	
and	politicians	care	mostly	about	the	change	of	the	deficit,	rather	than	its	level.	The	cost	
function	for	permanently	reducing	the	deficit	is	c(r)	in	the	period	when	the	adjustment	
is	made,	and	has	the	properties	c’≥0,	c’’	>	0,	c(0)	=	0,	and	c’(0)	=	0.	Strict	convexity	im‐
plies	that	spreading	a	given	deficit	reduction	over	time	is	efficient,	all	else	being	equal.		
The	deficit	in	period	1	is	a	function	of	the	initial	deficit	d0	minus	the	reduction	r0	under‐
taken	in	period	0.	The	deficit	d1	is	stochastic	due	to	a	shock	influencing	the	deficit	in	pe‐
riod	1.	The	shock	is	labeled	s	and	is	drawn	from	the	uniform	distribution	with	support	
[0,S],	where	S	>	0.	The	probability	density	function	is	thus	1/S.	The	realized	deficit	shock	
is	the	product	of	s	and	an	exogenous	government	competence	measure	q	>	0,	which	re‐
flects	the	ability	of	the	government	to	moderate	shocks.	Lower	levels	of	q	reflect	higher	
ability.	When	putting	these	elements	together	the	actual	deficit	in	period	1	is		
	 	
݀ଵ ൌ ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݍݏ.																																	 	 	 (1)	
In	period	1	the	government	reduces	the	deficit	further	by	choosing	r1	so	that		
	 	 ݀ଶ ൌ ݀ଵ െ ݎଵ.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2)	
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By	assumption	no	shock	is	assumed	to	take	place	in	period	2.	The	government	payoff	is	
given	by		
ܷ ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜሾݒ െ ܿሺݎଵሻሿ,	 	 	 	 	 (3)	
where	ݒ ൌ ݑ௖	when	the	government	is	compliant	in	period	2,	that	is	d2	≤	0,	and	ݒ ൌ ݑ௡௖	
when	not.		Let	ߜ ൑ 1		be	the	discount	factor.1	
	
2.1	Credible	Fiscal	Rule	
We	start	with	a	benchmark	situation	in	which	the	fiscal	rule	݀ଶ ൑ 0	is	credible	and	the	
government	must	comply	with	 it	 regardless	of	 the	realization	of	 the	shock	 in	period	1	
Therefore	 deficit	 reduction	 in	 period	 1	 is	 ݎଵ ൌ ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݍݏ.	 The	 expected	 utility	 from	
compliance	is	then	
				ܧሾܷሿ ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቂݑ௖ െ ଵௌ ׬ ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݍݏሻ
ௌ
଴ ݀ݏቃ,	 	 (4)	
where	we	made	use	of	 the	assumption	 that	 shocks	are	uniformly	distributed	over	 the	
interval	[0,S].	The	costs	of	compliance	come	from	the	cost	of	deficit	reduction	in	the	first	
period	plus	the	discounted,	probability	weighted	cost	in	period	1,	which	depend	on	the	
initial	deficit	d0,	period	0	deficit	reduction	r0,	and	the	magnitude	of	the	realized	shock	qs.	
The	government	influences	the	expected	utility	by	choosing	r0,	which	affects	the	distri‐
bution	of	deficit	reduction	costs	over	time.	The	optimal	first	period	deficit	reduction	is	
found	by	maximizing	 (4)	with	 respect	 to	 r0.	The	optimum	ݎ଴෥ 	is	 implicitly	 given	by	 the	
condition		 	
	 	 ఋሾ௖ሺௗబି௥బ෦ା௤ௌሻି௖ሺௗబି௥బ෦ሻሿ௤ௌ ൌ ܿᇱሺݎ଴෥ሻ.	 	 	 	 (5)	
Strict	convexity	of	the	cost	function	ensures	that	the	second	order	condition	holds.	The	
right	hand	side	of	(5)	represents	the	marginal	cost	of	increasing	deficit	reduction	in	pe‐
riod	0.	The	left	hand	side	captures	the	marginal	benefit	of	doing	so.	An	increase	in	period	
0	deficit	reduction	decreases	the	range	of	feasible	deficits	in	period	1,	which	on	net	saves	
cost	ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴෥ ൅ ݍܵሻ െ ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴෥ሻ.			
Inserting	the	optimal	value	ݎ଴෥ 	into	(4)	gives	the	maximal	utility	from	compliance		with	a	
credible	deficit	rule	and	is	denoted	ܷ௖௖ሺݎ଴෥ሻ.	 	We	like	to	note	that	there	is	no	guarantee	
                                                 
1 We could discount utility in period 2 by ߜଶ instead of ߜ.  Doing so would simply rescale the utility level v, 
without affecting results. We omit the complication in order to save on notation. 
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that	a	government	is	better	off	compared	to	not	complying	with	the	fiscal	rule	(the	latter	
is	by	assumption	not	a	choice,	though).		
	
2.2	Lack	of	commitment	
In	contrast	to	the	previous	section,	we	now	assume	that	the	compliance	decision	is	not	
forced	by	a	credible	rule.	The	cost	of	compliance	in	period	1	may	become	high	if	the	level	
of	deficit	reduction	in	period	0	is	low	and/or	the	realization	of	the	budget	shock	in	peri‐
od	1	 is	bad.	 In	such	a	situation,	a	government	may	find	it	attractive	to	not	comply.	We	
analyze	 the	 conditions	 under	which	 it	 is	 in	 the	 government’s	 interest	 to	 (not)	 comply	
with	the	fiscal	target,	and	if	so,	how	the	deficit	reduction	is	distributed	over	time.	For	the	
time	being	we	focus	on	the	political	decision	maker	and	her	interest	in	compliance.	Later	
we	 consider	 how	 other	 individuals	 (such	 as	 opposition	 politicians	 or	 observers	 from	
outside	of	state)	assess	the	likelihood	of	compliance.	
The	stochastic	nature	of	the	government	deficit	in	period	1	makes	it	uncertain	whether	
compliance	occurs.	An	important	variable	in	our	subsequent	analysis	is	the	probability	
of	compliance	p.	We	are	interested	in	the	relationship	between	p	and	exogenous	param‐
eters	of	the	model,	such	as	the	initial	deficit	d0,	the	gross	gain	from	compliance	u,	gov‐
ernment	competence	q,	possible	bailout	expectations,	 as	well	 as	additional	 fiscal	 rules	
restricting	the	maximum	deficit	level	in	period	1	(prior	to	the	existing	fiscal	rule	in	peri‐
od	2).	The	lack	of	commitment	requires	that	we	solve	the	model	by	backward	induction.	
Note	 that	 the	gross	gain	u	must	be	positive	 for	compliance	with	 the	 fiscal	 rule	 to	 take	
place	with	positive	probability	because	deficit	reduction	is	costly.		
	
Period	1.		
The	binary	payoff	structure	(ݑ௖, ݑ௡௖)	combined	with	costly	deficit	reduction	implies	that	
we	can	reduce	the	government	choice	set	to	two	options:	Either	not	reaching	the	deficit	
goal	in	period	2	(and	therefore	not	spending	any	effort,	r1	=	0)	or	just	reaching	the	goal	
(with	the	need	to	set	r1	=	d1).	The	latter	dominates	the	former	if	
	 	 	 ܿሺ݀ଵሻ ൑ ݑ ൌ ݑ௖ െ ݑ௡௖,	 	 	 	 (6)	
that	 is,	 the	 cost	 of	 reducing	 the	 deficit	 to	 zero	 is	 not	 higher	 than	 the	 gross	 gain	 from	
compliance.	Since	the	cost	of	deficit	reduction	c(r)	 is	a	monotone	function	of	r,	we	can	
invert	(6)	when	it	holds	with	equality,	and	define	a	critical	 level	of	the	period	1	deficit	
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for	compliance	to	occur,	namely,	݀ଵ∗ ൌ ܿିଵሺݑሻ.	For	d1	less	than	or	equal	to	d1*,	the	gov‐
ernment	will	 choose	 to	be	 compliant,	 otherwise	not.	Using	 (1),	 the	 threshold	 level	de‐
fines	implicitly	a	maximum	level	of	the	deficit	shock	s,	called	s*,	that	is	consistent	with	d2	
=	0.	The	critical	level	is	given	by		
	 	 ݏ∗ ൌ ௗభ∗ା௥బିௗబ௤ ൌ
௖షభሺ௨ሻା௥బିௗబ
௤ .	 	 	 	 (7)	
Instead	of	 stating	government	 compliance	 in	 terms	of	period	1	deficit	 (d1*),	 condition	
(7)	allows	us	to	restate	the	same	decision	in	terms	of	the	realized	value	of	the	shock	s:	
For	s	≤	s*	the	government	will	be	compliant,	otherwise	not.	The	threshold	 level	s*	 is	a	
positive	function	of	the	additional	gain	from	compliance	and	of	the	deficit	reduction	in	
period	 0,	 but	 depends	 negatively	 on	 initial	 deficit	 d0	 and	 the	 inverse	 of	 government	
competence	q	(the	latter	only	under	appropriate	assumptions	made	further	below).	We	
thus	write	s*	=	s(r0;u,d0,q).	Note	that	r0	is	exogenous	from	the	viewpoint	of	period	1,	but	
endogenous	ex	ante	(unlike	the	other	three	variables)	and	determined	in	period	0.	
Given	a	uniform	probability	density	function	for	s	we	now	use	(7)	to	introduce	the	prob‐
ability	of	compliance	with	the	fiscal	rule				
	 	 	 ݌ ൌ ௦∗ௌ ൌ
௖షభሺ௨ሻା௥బିௗబ
௤ௌ .		 	 	 	 (8)	
The	probability	p	is	the	key	object	for	our	further	analysis	and	lies	between	0	and	1	un‐
der	suitable	assumptions	on	the	size	of	d0	and	S.2	It	depends	on	(r0;u,d0,q,S).	Note	in	par‐
ticular	that		
	 	 	 డ௣డ௥బ 	ൌ 	െ	
డ௣
డௗబ 	ൌ 	
ଵ
௤ௌ ൐ 0,		 	 	 	 (9)	
that	is,	p	increases	(decreases)	with	the	level	of	period	0	deficit	reduction	(initial	deficit)	
and	the	change	is	given	by	the	competence	weighted	probability	density	of	the	variable	
s.	More	deficit	reduction	in	period	1	makes	compliance	with	the	fiscal	rule	more	likely.	
	
 	
                                                 
2 First, we assume that ܿିଵሺݑሻ ൒ ݀଴, which is sufficient to make s* in (7) nonnegative (because we assume r0 ≥ 
0). The condition holds, if the initial deficit is not too large relative to the gross gain of compliance. Second, we 
assume that the maximally possible shock S is sufficiently large so that s* ≤ S always holds. This assumption 
requires the initial deficit to be large enough. 
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Period	0.	
We	now	turn	to	the	analysis	of	period	0,	in	which	the	government	chooses	r0	and	there‐
fore	 affects	 the	 probability	 of	 compliance	 via	 (9).	 From	 the	 incumbent	 government’s	
view	in	period	0	the	utility	is	uncertain	due	to	the	shock	s.	The	expected	payoff	is			
ܧሾܷሿ ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜܵ ቎නሺݑ௖ െ
௦∗
଴
ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݍݏሻሻ݀ݏ ൅ නݑ௡௖
ௌ
௦∗
݀ݏ቏	
	ൌ െܿሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቂݑ௡௖ ൅ ݌ݑ െ ଵௌ ׬ ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݍݏሻ
௦∗
଴ ݀ݏቃ	 (10)	
The	 first	 line	shows	 in	square	brackets	 the	utility	 (periods	1	and	2)	under	compliance	
and	non‐compliance,	respectively,	depending	on	the	realization	of	the	shock	s.	For	 low	
levels	of	s,	s	≤	s*,	the	government	complies	in	period	1	by	deficit	reduction	leading	to	d2	
=	0	(the	first	integral).	If	s	is	higher	than	s*,	the	government	does	not	comply	(the	second	
integral).3	Rewriting	terms,	the	second	line	in	(10)	shows	in	brackets	the	same	expres‐
sion	as	before,	now	as	the	sum	of	the	guaranteed	utility	under	non‐compliance	and	the	
expected	 gross	 gain	 from	 compliance,	minus	 the	 cost	 of	 deficit	 reduction	 in	 period	 1	
when	s	is	sufficiently	small	(s<s*).	
First	period	deficit	 reduction	r0	affects	 (10)	via	 the	cost	of	effort	 in	period	0	 (the	 first	
term	in	(10)),	the	probability	of	realizing	the	gross	gain	of	compliance	p,	and	the	cost	of	
effort	in	period	2	in	the	latter	case.	Recall	that	the	threshold	level	s*	is	a	function	of	r0	via	
(7)	and	(9).	The	derivative	of	expected	utility	with	respect	to	r0	is		
݀ܧሾܷሿ
݀ݎ଴ ൌ 	െܿ
ᇱሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቎ݑ ݀݌݀ݎ଴ െ
1
ܵන
݀ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݍݏሻ
݀ݎ଴
௦∗
଴
݀ݏ െ 1ܵ ܿሺ݀଴ െ ݎ଴ ൅ ݍݏ
∗ሻ ݀ݏ
∗
݀ݎ଴቏	
	 	 			 ൌ െܿᇱሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ߜ ቂ௨ି௖ሺௗబି௥బሻ௤ௌ ቃ	 	 	 	 (11)	
Derivative	(11)	has	the	following	interpretation:	An	increase	in	r0	increases	the	marginal	
cost	of	deficit	 reduction	 in	 the	 current	period.	The	marginal	benefit	 of	doing	 so	 is	 the	
discounted	 increase	 in	 the	 expected	 gross	 gain	 of	 compliance	 (due	 to	 the	 increase	 in	
probability	of	compliance)	adjusted	for	the	cost	of	reducing	the	deficit	by	d0	‐	r0.	Recall	
                                                 
3 This assumes implicitly that d1 >0, which holds, if r0<d0.  
10 
 
that	 (qS)‐1	 represents	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 probability	 of	 compliance	when	 r0	 is	 raised	
marginally.4	
Evaluating	(11)	at	two	values	of	r0	provides	additional	insight:	On	the	one	hand,	at	r0	=	0	
the	marginal	cost	of	deficit	reduction	in	period	0	is	zero	by	assumption,	and	hence	the	
expected	utility	gain	dE[U]/dr0	is	positive	when	the	gross	gain	u	is	larger	than	the	cost	of	
reducing	the	original	deficit	d0	(u>c(d0)).	We	make	that	assumption,	which	insures	that	
r0	≤	0	cannot	be	a	solution	to	(11)	(when	set	equal	to	zero).		At	r0	=	d0,	on	the	other	hand,	
the	government	faces	high	marginal	cost	initially,	but	gains	by	increasing	the	probability	
of	 compliance	 (1/(qS))	weighted	by	 the	gross	gain	u.	We	assume	c’(d0)	>	 	 δu/(qS),	 so	
that	dE[U]/dr0	<	0	at	r0	=	d0.		Thus	a	local	maximum	must	obtain	in	the	interval	between	
0	and	d0.	The	optimal	 level	of	 first	period	deficit	 reduction	 ̂ݎ଴	 is	 found	by	 setting	 (11)	
equal	to	zero,	which	gives			
	 	 	 	 ఋሾ௨ି௖ሺௗబି௥̂బሻሿ௤ௌ ൌ ܿᇱሺ̂ݎ଴ሻ.		 	 	 (12)	
Given	our	assumptions	just	made,	the	second	order	condition	is	fulfilled	at	ݎ଴ ൌ ̂ݎ଴:	
െܿᇱᇱሺݎ଴ሻ ൅ ఋ௖
ᇲሺௗబି௥బሻ
௤ௌ ൏ 0.	 	 	 	 (13)		
	
2.3	Results	
We	 now	 study	 the	 effects	 of	 exogenous	 variables	 on	 the	 probability	 of	 compliance	 p,	
which		depends	on	exogenous	model	parameters	both	directly,	as	shown	in	(8),	but	also	
indirectly	via	the	optimal	level	of	initial	deficit	reduction	r0,	as	implicitly	defined	in	(12).	
The	latter	is	the	period	0	anticipation	effect,	whereas	the	former	is	the	period	1	compli‐
ance	incentive	effect.	
	
1.	 Initial	 deficit:	 Differentiation	 of	 (12)	 shows	 that	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 initial	 deficit	 d0	
leads	to	a	lower	government	effort	in	initial	deficit	reduction,	that	is		
	 	 	 డ௥̂బడௗబ ൌ
௖ᇲሺௗబି௥̂బሻ
ሾఋ௖ᇲሺௗబି௥̂బሻି௤ௌ௖ᇲᇲሺ௥̂బሻሿ ൏ 0,	 	 	 (14)	
                                                 
4 The difference between the optimal deficit reduction under credible and non-credible fiscal rules is twofold. 
First, the utility gain from compliance u appears in (11) but not in (5) because with a credible rule the govern-
ment always obtains uc. Second, the marginal benefit of extending r0 does not contain the cost term c(d1) in (11) 
because an increase in r0 reduces the cost of deficit reduction for given probability of compliance (p or s* in 
(10)), but at the same time makes compliance more likely (s* goes up). The two effects cancel out. 
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which	is	negative	by	the	second	order	condition.	The	probability	of	compliance	p	is	also	
lowered	by	the	direct	(compliance	incentive)	effect	so	that	the	total	effect	becomes		
	 	 	 	 డ௣డௗబ ൌ
ଵ
௤ௌ ቀ
డ௥̂బ
డௗబ െ 1ቁ ൏ 0.	 	 	 (15)	
States	with	a	larger	initial	deficit	are	less	likely	to	comply	with	the	balanced	budget	re‐
quirement	in	period	2	(Hypothesis	1:	H1).	
	
2.	Bailout	expectations:	 Up	 to	 now	we	did	not	 explicitly	 address	 the	 role	 of	 a	 possible	
bailout	in	case	of	non‐compliance	with	the	fiscal	rule.	Rather	we	assigned	a	utility	level	
for	the	case	of	non‐compliance,	assuming	it	to	be	lower	than	in	case	of	compliance.	Sup‐
pose	now	 that	 a	 bailout	 is	 possible	 but	 less	 than	 certain	 (so	non‐compliance	 is	worse	
than	 compliance	 in	 expected	 terms:	 unc<	 uc),	 and	 consider	 that	 the	 probability	 of	 a	
bailout	goes	up.	This	affects	the	government	effort	in	reaching	the	deficit	target.	Formal‐
ly,	we	capture	the	bailout	probability	by	interpreting	the	utility	from	non‐compliance	unc	
as	expected	utility,	which	comprises	the	utility	when	no	bailout	occurs	and	when	it	does	
occur.	An	increase	in	the	bailout	probability	thus	leads	to	a	higher	level	of	unc,	and	thus	
lower	net	utility	gain	u.	The	comparative	statics	are		 	
	 	 	 డ௥̂బడ௨ ൌ
ିଵ
ሾఋ௖ᇱሺௗబି௥̂బሻି௤ௌ௖ᇲᇲሺ௥̂బሻሿ ൐ 0,	 	 	 (16)	
thus	lowering	the	effort	in	initial	deficit	reduction.	Moreover,	a	higher	bailout	utility	re‐
duces	 the	probability	of	 compliance	because	a	decrease	 in	u	decreases	p	both	directly	
and	indirectly:		
	 	 	 డ௣డ௨ ൌ
ଵ
௤ௌ ቀܿିଵ
ᇲሺݑሻ ൅ డ௥̂బడ௨ቁ ൐ 0.		 	 	 (17)	
We	conclude	that	higher	bailout	expectations	make	compliance	with	the	balanced	budg‐
et	requirement	less	likely	(Hypothesis	2:	H2).	
	
3.	State	 fiscal	rule	 in	period	1:	The	 fiscal	rule	under	consideration	becomes	effective	 in	
period	2.	Some	states	in	Germany	have	introduced	fiscal	rules	at	the	state	level	with	con‐
straints	becoming	effective	prior	 to	 the	national	debt	brake’s	crucial	year	2020.	These	
state	 rules	 are	 supposed	 to	 strengthen	 the	 effort	 and	 likelihood	 of	 compliance.	 In	 the	
present	 framework	we	capture	 this	 idea	by	allowing	 for	an	additional	 fiscal	rule	 to	be	
already	effective	in	period	1.	We	assume	that	the	additional	fiscal	rule	is	credible,	per‐
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haps	because	there	is	no	one	to	bail	out	the	government	within	the	state.	Yet	we	allow	
for	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 fiscal	 rule	 may	 be	 of	 different	 strictness.	 We	 express	 the	
strictness	 in	 terms	of	 the	maximum	 feasible	deficit	 that	 can	occur	 in	period	1,	d0	+qS.	
The	upper	limit	of	the	deficit	in	period	1	must	obey		 	
	 	 	 	 ݀ଵ ൑ ݀̅ଵ ൌ ߙሺ݀଴ ൅ ݍܵሻ.	 	 	 (18)	
The	parameter	α	from	[0,1]	represents	the	strength	of	the	fiscal	rule.	The	fiscal	rule	has	
no	bite	whatsoever	when	α=1	because	no	deficit	reduction	is	necessary	in	period	0	to	be	
compliant	with	the	new	rule	in	period	1.	By	contrast,	α=0	means	that	the	government	is	
not	allowed	to	run	a	government	deficit	in	period	1	regardless	of	s	when	the	new	fiscal	
rule	is	credible.	This	would	mandate	deficit	reduction	in	period	0	of	݀଴ ൅ ݍܵ,	thus	induc‐
ing	d1൑ 0.	Lower	values	of	α	thus	correspond	to	a	tighter	fiscal	rule	in	period	1.	Using	(2)	
we	can	reformulate	the	requirement	in	(18)	in	terms	of	initial	deficit	reduction:		
		 	 	 	 ݎ଴ ൒ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ݀଴ ൅ ݍܵሻ ൌ: ݎ଴ഥ .	 	 (19)	
Note	that		ݎ଴ഥ 		is	decreasing	in	α.		A	tighter	fiscal	rule	in	period	1	requires	a	higher	deficit	
reduction	effort	in	period	0.	Whether	the	additional	fiscal	rule	has	bite	depends	on	the	
magnitudes	of	ݎ଴ഥ 	and	̂ݎ଴,	where	the	latter	is	taken	from	(12)	and	represents	the	optimal	
choice	of	initial	deficit	reduction	in	the	absence	of	the	fiscal	rule	in	period	1.	When	ݎ଴ഥ ൐	
̂ݎ଴,	the	new	fiscal	rule	is	binding,	otherwise	it	is	not.	This	result	has	further	ramifications	
for	the	probability	of	compliance	with	the	original	 fiscal	rule	 in	period	2.	Probability	p	
depends	positively	on	r0.		
We	 conclude	 that	 the	 likelihood	of	 compliance	 (weakly)	 increases	 in	 the	 strength	of	 a	
credible	fiscal	rule	at	state	level	which	restricts	the	period	1	deficit	(Hypothesis	3:	H3).	
	
4.		Individual	Beliefs:	Consider	now	the	beliefs	in	government	compliance	after	the	deci‐
sion	 on	period	0	 deficit	 reduction	has	 been	 taken	but	 before	 the	 shock	 s	 realizes.	We	
thus	 focus	 on	 the	 expectations	 at	 an	 interim	 stage	 for	 a	 given	 level	 of	 r0.	We	wish	 to	
compare	 the	 beliefs	 in	 compliance	 of	 two	 types	 of	 politicians:	 the	 incumbent	 govern‐
ment	or	in‐state	legislatures	on	the	one	hand,	and	opposition	politicians	or	out‐of‐state	
politicians	on	the	other	hand.	
The	psychological	literature	(see	Moore	and	Healy,	2008)	suggests	that	a	large	number	
of	 individuals	 (more	 than	 half)	 believe	 to	 perform	 better	 than	 the	 average/median,	
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which	 is	 impossible.	 This	 is	 termed	 overconfidence.	 In	 the	 present	 context	 this	 could	
mean	 that	 the	 incumbent	government	believes	 its	 competency	 to	be	higher	 than	what	
the	opposition	asserts,	that	is,	the	government	believes	to	have	a	lower	value	of	q	than	
what	 the	opposition	 thinks	 this	value	 to	be.	This	assumption	does	not	require	a	state‐
ment	about	 the	 true	competence,	only	 that	 the	 two	beliefs	differ.	Equation	(8)	 implies	
immediately	 that	 for	 given	 r0	 the	 incumbent’s	 subjective	 probability	 of	 compliance	 is	
higher	than	that	of	the	opposition.	This	effect	is	reinforced	when	period	0	deficit	reduc‐
tion	is	endogenous.	To	see	this,	note	that	the	effect	from	higher	values	of	q	on	deficit	re‐
duction	in	period	0	is	found	by	differentiation	of	(12),	assuming	that	q	is	the	true	value:		
	 	 	 డ௥̂బడ௤ ൌ
ௌ௖ᇲሺ௥̂బሻ
ሾఋ௖ᇱሺௗబି௥̂బሻି௤ௌ௖ᇲᇲሺ௥̂బሻሿ ൏ 0,	 	 	 (20)	
which	 is	 negative	 by	 the	 second	 order	 condition.	 The	 incumbent	 government	 is	more	
optimistic	about	the	likelihood	of	compliance	in	period	1	and	thus	undertakes	more	ef‐
fort	in	period	0,	which	in	turn	makes	compliance	more	likely.		
Alternatively,	we	may	assume	that	 insiders	(which	may	be	 the	 incumbent	government	
or	 in‐state	 legislators)	 know	 the	 government’s	 competence	 exactly,	 denoted	 by	 q,	 but	
outsiders	 (which	may	 be	 the	 opposition	 or	 out‐of‐state	 politicians)	 have	 only	 a	 noisy	
signal	 about	 the	 government’s	 competence.	 Specifically,	we	 assume	 that	 outsiders	 be‐
lieve	 that	 government	 competence	 is	 ql	with	probability	 z	 and	qh	with	probability	1‐z	
such	that	E[q]	=	zql	+	(1‐z)qh	=	q.	The	expected	value	of	the	outsiders’	subjective	belief	of	
government	 competence	 equals	 therefore	 the	 true	 government	 competence.	We	 now	
compare	the	expected	compliance	of	the	government	by	comparing	the	beliefs	of	insid‐
ers	and	outsiders,	again	at	an	interim	stage	when	r0	has	been	set	already.	The	insider’s	
belief	is	simply		
	 	 	 ݌௜௡௦ ൌ ௖షభሺ௨ሻା௥బିௗబ௤ௌ .		 	 	 	 	 (21)	
By	contrast,	the	outsider’s	expected	likelihood	of	compliance	by	the	government	is		
	 	 ݌௢௢௧ ൌ ݖ ቂ௖షభሺ௨ሻା௥బିௗబ௤೗ௌ ቃ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݖሻ ቂ
௖షభሺ௨ሻା௥బିௗబ
௤೓ௌ ቃ	 	 (22)	 							
	 	 ൌ ݌௜௡௦ݍ ቂ ௭௤೗ ൅
ሺଵି௭ሻ
௤೓ ቃ.	 	 	 	
Comparison	of	(21)	and	(22)	shows	that	pout	>	pins.	In	other	words,	the	outsider	believes	
under	noisy	information	that	the	government	is	more	likely	to	comply	than	the	insider.	
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The	intuition	comes	from	the	observation	that	the	probability	p	in	(8)	is	a	convex	func‐
tion	of	q.		
We	conclude	that	the	outsiders	(political	opposition	or	out‐of‐state	politicians)	are	more	
optimistic	about	compliance	than	insiders	(the	incumbent	or	in‐state	politicians)	under	
noisy	 information	 about	 the	 incumbent	 government’s	 competence	 but	 less	 optimistic	
under	overconfidence	(Hypothesis	4:	H4).		
Thus,	our	model	arrives	at	hypotheses	on	the	heterogeneity	of	compliance	expectations	
across	individual	politicians.	These	hypotheses	are	derived	for	a	setting	where	jurisdic‐
tions	are	confronted	with	an	identical	fiscal	rule,	as	it	is	the	case	for	German	states	and	
the	national	debt	brake.	Our	survey	among	members	of	German	state	parliaments	offers	
the	basis	for	testing	their	relevance.	
	
3.	Institutional	and	survey	details	
3.1.	Germany’s	federal	system	and	the	constitutional	debt	brake	
Before	we	introduce	the	survey	we	provide	a	brief	introduction	to	Germany’s	electoral,	
political	and	fiscal	system	(for	a	more	detailed	description	of	the	German	party	and	elec‐
toral	system	the	reader	is	referred	to	Roberts,	1988,	and	Poguntke,	1994).		
Democracy.	 Germany	 is	 a	 parliamentary	democracy	with	 two	 chambers	 at	 the	 federal	
level:	the	lower	chamber	called	Bundestag,	which	is	elected	by	all	citizens,	and	the	upper	
chamber	called	Bundesrat,	which	represents	the	16	states	of	Germany	and	whose	mem‐
bers	are	delegates	of	state	governments.	The	debt	brake	was	approved	in	2009	by	more	
than	the	2/3	required	majority	in	both	chambers	in	order	to	change	the	constitution.	At	
the	state	level,	there	exists	only	one	chamber	like	the	lower	chamber	at	the	federal	level.	
We	surveyed	members	of	these	state	parliaments,	called	MSP	henceforth.	
Parties.	 The	 number	 of	 political	 parties	 has	 some	 regional	 variation.	We	 describe	 the	
main	parties:	The	Christian	Democrats	(CDU/CSU)	are	a	centre‐right	party,	which	pur‐
sues	a	relatively	market	oriented	policy	but	which	is	socially	conservative	in	some	states	
(like	Bavaria)	and	on	some	policy	issues	(such	as	the	traditional	role	of	the	family).	The	
Social	Democratic	 Party	 (SPD)	 is	 the	 other	major	 party	 and	 represents	 the	 center‐left	
(less	market	oriented	than	the	Christian	Democrats,	socially	progressive	and	in	favor	of	
more	 intense	 redistribution	 than	 CDU/CSU).	 The	 Free	 Democratic	 Party	 (FDP)	 is	 the	
most	market	 oriented	 party	which	 favors	 small	 government	 and	 low	 taxes.	 On	 social	
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issues	it	is	more	progressive	than	the	Christian	Democrats.	The	Left	Party	unites	former	
communists	 in	 East	 Germany	 (mostly	 pragmatic)	 and	 disappointed	 Social	 Democrats	
from	the	left	wing	in	West	Germany	(more	ideological).	The	Green	Party	is	also	on	the	
centre‐left	and	pushes	for	environmental	and	social	reforms	with	diverse	views	on	eco‐
nomic	issues.	The	party	is	popular	with	well‐educated	individuals	from	the	middle	class.		
Fiscal	Federalism.	The	German	state	features	three	government	layers	with	partly	over‐
lapping	 areas	 of	 policy	 responsibility:	 (1)	 the	 federal	 level,	 (2)	 the	 states,	 and	 (3)	 the	
municipal	level.	Tax	autonomy	at	the	state	level	is	relatively	low.	Revenues	are	equalized	
to	a	significant	degree	across	states	and	in	addition	through	vertical	tax	sharing.		Differ‐
ences	 in	 state	 revenues	per	capita	are	 reduced	via	a	 fiscal	equalization	system,	whose	
legal	foundation	is	set	in	Article	106	of	the	German	constitution	(Grundgesetz),	accord‐
ing	 to	 which	 material	 living	 conditions	 should	 be	 comparable	 across	 German	 states.	
Through	the	large	degree	of	revenue	sharing	the	German	federal	system	is	closer	to	be‐
ing	 an	 example	 of	 cooperative	 fiscal	 federalism	 rather	 than	 competitive	 federalism	
(Braun,	 2007;	 for	 details	 on	 equalization	 and	 tax	 sharing	 see	 also	 Heinemann	 et	 al.,	
2013).		
Fiscal	Rules.	The	fiscal	rule	is	the	German	debt	brake	(“Schuldenbremse”),	which	became	
part	 of	 the	German	 constitution	 (the	 “Grundgesetz”)	 in	 2009.	 It	was	motivated	 by	 the	
continuing	buildup	of	public	debt	across	all	 	levels	of	government	since	the	1970s.	The	
new	 constitutional	 rule	 requires	 the	 federal	 government	 to	 run	 a	 (cyclically	 adjusted)	
budget	deficit	of	no	more	than	0.35%	of	GDP	starting	in	2016	(see	Bundesministerium	
für	 Finanzen,	 2009	 for	 a	 detailed	 description).	 For	 German	 states	 (“Länder”)	 the	 new	
rule	is	more	stringent	and	requires	them	to	run	a	zero	deficit	(cyclically	adjusted).	The	
zero	deficit	constraint	for	the	states	does	not	become	legally	effective	until	the	budget‐
ary	year	2020.	The	rule	for	the	federal	government	is	accompanied	with	a	specific	plan	
detailing	how	the	structural	deficit	shall	be	reduced	between	2011	and	2015	so	that	the	
target	is	reached	in	2016.	For	the	states,	no	specific	path	exists	in	general.	However,	five	
states	 (Berlin,	Bremen,	 Saarland,	 Saxony‐Anhalt	und	Schleswig‐Holstein)	 receive	 “con‐
solidation	aids”	in	total	of	€800	million	annually	until	2019.	In	return	they	are	required	
to	reduce	their	2010	budget	deficit	 in	equal	steps	until	2020.	As	a	reaction	to	the	new	
national	 constitutional	 rule,	 several	 states	 have	 adjusted	 their	 state	 constitutions	 or	
state	budgetary	laws	with	rules	echoing	or	even	sharpeninig	the	national	rule	(for	a	sur‐
vey	see	Ciaglia	and	Heinemann,	2013).		
16 
 
Enforcement.	The	Stability	Council	(“Stabilitätsrat”)	has	the	task	to	supervise	fiscal	per‐
formance	and	compliance	both	at	the	federal	and	the	state	level.	It	represents	the	federal	
ministers	 for	 finance	and	economics	as	well	as	all	 state	 finance	ministers.	The	Council	
has	relatively	little	power	to	enforce	fiscal	rules	and	improve	fiscal	performance	because	
it	is	not	allowed	to	impose	monetary	sanctions	directly.		In	the	case	of	the	five	states	re‐
ceiving	 consolidation	 aids	 the	 Council	 is	 entitled	 to	 withhold	 aids	 in	 case	 of	 non‐
compliance.	Non‐monetary	sanctions	for	all	states	originate	from	the	possible	publicity	
of	the	Stability	Council’s	statements	or	from	political	costs	materializing	if	a	state	budget	
is	ruled	as	unconstitutional	by	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court.	
Economic	 Performance.	 The	 lack	 of	 comprehensive	 monetary	 sanctions	 and	 the	 long	
transitory	period	raise	serious	questions	about	the	new	rule’s	credibility.	In	addition,	the	
highly	 diverse	 fiscal	 situation	 of	 states	 feeds	 diverging	 expectations.	 Table	 1	 provides	
information	on	key	indicators	and	shows	the	large	difference	in	economic	activity.	GDP	
per	capita	in	Hamburg,	for	example,	is	more	than	twice	as	large	as	in	most	eastern	states.	
Debt	 to	 state	 GDP	 is	 particularly	 high	 for	 the	 city	 states	 of	 Berlin	 and	 Bremen	 (both	
above	60%).	Often	high	debt	 levels	go	hand	 in	hand	with	 large	projected	 fiscal	adjust‐
ments,	as	identified	by	the	German	Council	of	Economic	Advisors’	calculation	of	consoli‐
dation	 need	 (an	 index	 ranging	 from	 ‐0.6	 +3.5,	where	Berlin	 and	Bremen	 are	 near	 the	
maximum).	In	the	light	of	these	fiscal	performances	it	is	somewhat	surprising	that	credit	
ratings	 are	 fairly	 positive	 in	 all	 states	 (all	 in	 the	A	 range).	One	 explanation	 consistent	
with	these	observations	is	that	bailout	expectations	exist.	Because	these	rankings	appar‐
ently	do	not	reflect	the	strength	of	the	debt	rule	at	the	state	level	in	great	detail,	the	last	
column	of	Table	1	provides	an	index	for	the	stringency	of	German	individual	states’	fis‐
cal	rules	as	developed	by	Ciaglia	and	Heinemann	(2013).	This	index	takes	account	of	the	
rule’s	contents	and	precision,	legal	basis	and	enforcement.	
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Table	1:	Economic	and	Fiscal	Indicators	
	 Popula‐
tion	2011	
(in	mil‐
lions)	
GDP	per	
capita	
2011	(in	
thousands	
of	€)	
Total	debt	
to	GDP	
ratio	
2011	(in	
%)	
Need	for	
Consoli‐
dation	
2011‐
2020	(in	
%	of	GDP)
Bond	
Rating	
2012a	
Index	of	
stringen‐
cy	of	state	
debt	rule	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Federal	
Government	
81.84	 44.02	 49.79e	 ‐	 AAAd,e	 	
		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Baden‐
Württemberg	 10.79	 34.89	 17.16	 0.10	 AAAd		 0.62	
Bavaria	 12.60	 35.44	 6.79	 ‐0.60	 AAAd		 0.48	
Berlin	 3.50	 28.95	 61.64	 3.50	 Aa1c	 0.65	
Brandenburg	 2.50	 22.08	 35.77	 2.10	 Aa1c	 0.51	
Bremen	 0.66	 42.39	 73.63	 3.40	 ‐	 0.64	
Hamburg	 1.80	 52.49	 26.86	 0.30	 ‐	 0.47	
Hesse	 6.09	 37.51	 17.28	 1.30	 AAd	 0.50	
Mecklenburg‐
West	Pomerania	 1.63	 21.40	 29.11	 1.70	 ‐	 0.46	
Lower	Saxony	 7.91	 28.35	 25.42	 1.30	 ‐	 0.55	
North	Rhine‐
Westphalia	 17.84	 31.88	 33.22	 1.60	 AA‐d	 0.45	
Rhineland‐
Palatinate	 4.00	 28.31	 32.49	 1.80	 AAAb	 0.69	
Saarland	 1.01	 30.10	 41.83	 2.80	 ‐	 0.70	
Saxony	 4.14	 22.98	 9.99	 0.60	 AAAd	 0.76	
Saxony‐Anhalt	 2.31	 22.43	 39.84	 2.50	 AA+d	 0.77	
Schleswig‐
Holstein	 2.84	 25.95	 38.57	 1.30	 AAAb	 0.77	
Thuringia	 2.22	 21.66	 35.04	 2.30	 AAAb	 0.66	
Notes:	 a	 from	 http://www.welt.de/finanzen/article107267058/Bundeslaender‐profitieren‐von‐Deutschland‐Bonds.html	
last	access	on	23	July	2013;	b	Fitch;	c	Moody’s;	d	S&P,	e	referring	to	federal	level	alone,	not	to	aggregate	for	Germany.	Need	
for	consolidation	 is	 taken	 from	Sachverständigenrat	 (2011)	and	 is	based	on	 the	average	budget	deficits	 from	2007	 to	
2010.	It	indicates	the	extent	of	consolidation	necessary	to	comply	with	the	debt	brake	by	2020.	For	that	purpose,	it	takes	
account	for	pension	obligations	and	the	reduction	of	transfers	from	the	federal	level	(Special	Purpose	Grants)	which	will	
both	come	into	effect	until	2020.	The	Index	of	stringency	of	the	debt	rule	 is	normalized	between	0	and	1,	where	higher	
values	indicate	a	more	stringent	debt	rule	(Ciaglia	and	Heinemann,	2013).			
	
Hence,	both	the	legal	setting	and	the	fiscal	divergence	leave	ample	space	for	highly	het‐
erogeneous	 expectations	 on	 state	 compliance	 which	 we	 study	 through	 our	 survey	
among	members	of	parliament.	
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3.2.	The	survey	among	members	of	state	parliaments	
Our	survey	was	sent	to	all	members	of	the	16	German	state	parliaments	during	a	period	
of	14	months	 in	2011	and	2012.	We	conducted	 the	 survey	 in	 three	waves	 in	order	 to	
make	sure	that	it	did	not	collide	with	election	times	(surveys	were	conducted	approxi‐
mately	 at	mid‐term	 of	 an	 electoral	 cycle).	We	 approached	members	 of	 parliament	 by	
written	letters	and	subsequent	follow‐up	emails.	If	still	unsuccessful,	we	contacted	them	
by	phone.	Taken	all	three	waves	together	639	politicians	finally	participated	in	the	sur‐
vey	which	resulted	in	a	response	rate	of	34%.	Response	rates	differ	along	state	and	par‐
ty	affiliation.	Table	2	provides	an	overview.	Possible	concerns	about	the	effect	of	differ‐
ent	response	rates	are	dealt	with	in	the	econometric	analysis	below.	
 
Table 2: Response rates and survey waves 
	 Number	
of	MSPs	
Number	of	
responses	
Response	
rate	
Survey	
wavea	
Last	
election	
before	
survey	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Overall	 1861	 639	 34.34%	 	 	
		 	 	 	 	 	
Baden‐Württemberg	 138	 77	 55.80%	 3	 3/2011	
Bavaria	 187	 75	 40.11%	 1	 9/2008	
Berlin	 149	 30	 20.13%	 3	 9/2011	
Brandenburg	 88	 19	 21.59%	 1	 9/2009	
Bremen	 83	 18	 21.69%	 3	 5/2011	
Hamburg	 124	 39	 31.45%	 2	 2/2011	
Hesse	 114	 50	 43.86%	 2	 1/2009	
Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania	 71	 17	 23.94%	 3	 9/2011	
Lower	Saxony	 152	 54	 35.53%	 1	 1/2008	
North	Rhine‐Westphalia	 181	 51	 28.18%	 2	 5/2010	
Rhineland‐Palatinate	 101	 50	 49.50%	 3	 3/2011	
Saarland	 51	 20	 39.22%	 1	 8/2009	
Saxony	 133	 45	 33.83%	 2	 8/2009	
Saxony‐Anhalt	 106	 47	 44.79%	 2	 3/2011	
Schleswig‐Holstein	 95	 29	 30.53%	 1	 9/2009	
Thuringia	 88	 36	 40.91%	 1	 8/2009	
Notes:	a	The	first	wave	(1)	took	place	in	March	and	April	2011,	the	second	wave	(2)	took	place	in	December	2011	and	
January	2012,	and	the	third	wave	(3)	took	place	in	April	and	May	2012		
	
The	survey	was	non‐anonymous	but	politicians	were	guaranteed	confidentiality	for	in‐
dividual	 responses.	 Thus,	 we	 are	 able	 to	 match	 the	 survey	 responses	 with	 personal	
characteristics	such	as	education,	committee	membership,	etc.	from	public	sources	(per‐
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sonal	or	parliamentary	websites)	and	with	state	characteristics	such	as	GDP	per	capita,	
debt,	need	for	fiscal	consolidation,	etc.	(see	Table	A1	in	the	appendix	for	all	variables).	
The	questionnaire	consisted	of	eight	questions	covering	preferences	for	revenue	auton‐
omy	 and	 fiscal	 equalization,	 spending	 preferences	 as	well	 as	 questions	 related	 to	 the	
debt	brake	(for	a	full	description	see	Heinemann	et	al.,	2014).	For	our	study,	we	focus	on	
the	following	two	questions:		
Question	compliance	expectation:	Which	of	the	16	German	states	will	comply	with	the	
constitutional	debt	brake	as	of	2020	with	high	probability?		
	
Each	of	the	16	states	could	be	ticked	individually	or	options	“all”	or	“none”	could	be	cho‐
sen.		
In	order	to	illuminate	the	expected	impact	of	the	debt	brake	we	also	asked	for	the	con‐
sequences	of	non‐compliance:	
Question	consequences	of	non‐compliance:	What	will	happen	if	German	states	do	not	
comply	with	the	constitutional	debt	brake	as	of	2020?	(multiple	answers	possible)	
	
o Constitutional	courts	(on	state	and	federal	levels)	will	enforce	budget	consolidation	
o The	constitution	will	be	changed	so	as	to	relax	the	debt	brake	
o Transfer	payments	to	non‐complying	states	are	given,	which	help	to	lower	the	deficit	
o There	 will	 be	 sanctions	 against	 non‐complying	 states,	 e.g.,	 lower	 transfers	 within	 the	
federal	fiscal	equalization	scheme	
o There	 will	 be	 ordinary	 legal	 or	 constitutional	 interventions	 in	 non‐complying	 states’	
budget	autonomy	
o Merger	of	states	
o Nothing	will	happen	
o Other:___________	
	
Figure	1	indicates	that	the	debt	rule	credibility	is	imperfect	and	compliance	expectations	
differ	remarkably	across	states.	While	Bavaria	is	seen	as	an	almost	certain	case	of	com‐
pliance	 (85%	believe	 it	 is	 highly	 probable)	 the	 prospects	 of	 the	 city	 states	 of	Bremen	
(3%)	 and	 Berlin	 (4%)	 are	 highly	 pessimistic.	 These	 expectations	 obviously	 correlate	
closely	with	 current	 consolidation	 needs	 and	 debt	 levels	 (see	 Table	 1).	 In	 addition,	 a	
strong	asymmetry	emerges	for	insider/outsider	expectations	on	financially	weak	states	
(see	 Figure	 2	with	 the	 example	 for	Mecklenburg‐West	 Pomerania):	While	MSPs	 from	
other	states	are	highly	skeptical,	a	large	majority	of	politicians	from	economically	weak‐
er	states	expect	their	state	to	respect	the	debt	brake	zero	deficit	cap	by	the	year	2020	
(see	Table	A2	in	the	appendix	for	full	information	on	cross‐state	expectations	which	con‐
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firms	 this	 asymmetry	 in	 general).	 Figure	 3	 summarizes	 the	 results	 for	 the	 non‐
compliance	 question:	 For	 this	 scenario,	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 politicians	 expect	 a	
strong	role	of	constitutional	courts	(both	from	federal	and	state	level)	to	enforce	consol‐
idation	 or	 sanction.	 However,	 a	 large	 fraction	 of	 politicians	 expect	 the	 government	
budget	 constraint	 to	 be	 soft	 due	 to	 bailout‐transfers	 or	 a	 relaxation	 of	 the	 strict	 debt	
brake.	Overall,	these	descriptive	findings	point	to	the	possible	relevance	of	our	model’s	
prediction	on	the	role	of	the	initial	fiscal	situation,	bailout	expectations	or	the	expected	
asymmetry	 between	 insiders	 and	 outsiders.	We	 substantiate	 the	model’s	 explanatory	
power	in	the	subsequent	regression	analysis.	
 
Figure 1: Compliance across states 
	BB=Brandenburg,	 BE=Berlin,	 BW=Baden‐Württemberg,	 BY=Bavaria,	 HB=Bremen,	
HE=Hesse,	 HH=Hamburg,	 MV=Mecklenburg‐West	 Pomerania,	 NI=Lower	 Saxony,	 NW=	
North	 Rhine‐Westphalia,	 RP=Rhineland‐Palatinate,	 SH=Schleswig‐Holstein,	
SL=Saarland,	SN=Saxony,	ST=Saxony‐Anhalt,	TH=Thuringia	
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Figure	2:	Compliance	expectation	Mecklenburg‐West	Pomerania	
	
BB=Brandenburg,	 BE=Berlin,	 BW=Baden‐Württemberg,	 BY=Bavaria,	 HB=Bremen,	
HE=Hesse,	 HH=Hamburg,	 MV=Mecklenburg‐West	 Pomerania,	 NI=Lower	 Saxony,	 NW=	
North	 Rhine‐Westphalia,	 RP=Rhineland‐Palatinate,	 SH=Schleswig‐Holstein,	
SL=Saarland,	SN=Saxony,	ST=Saxony‐Anhalt,	TH=Thuringia	
	
	
Figure	3:	Consequences	of	Non‐Compliance	
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4.	Regression	analyses	
Our	 database	 is	 sufficiently	 rich	 to	 test	 whether	 the	 predictions	 from	 our	 theoretical	
model	 on	 expectation	 heterogeneity	 are	 consistent	with	 the	 observable	 response	 pat‐
tern.	Our	model	predicts	that	compliance	expectations	of	politicians	should	be	related	to	
the	initial	deficit,	or	more	general,	the	initial	economic	and	fiscal	conditions	of	the	state	
in	question	(H1),	the	individual	politician’s	bailout	expectations	(H2),	the	existence	and	
characteristics	of	 state	 rules	which	 complement	 the	national	debt	brake	 (H3),	 and	 the	
individual	politician’s	insider/outsider	status	(due	to	either	asymmetric	information	or	
overconfidence	on	the	side	of	incumbents,	H4).	We	cover	these	four	dimensions	as	fol‐
lows	(for	precise	variable	information	see	Table	A1	in	the	appendix):	
- The	state	characteristics	merged	to	the	politician’s	responses	include	GDP	per	capita	
and	the	need	for	consolidation	(see	Table	1).	The	 latter	gives	a	comprehensive	pic‐
ture	of	the	current	fiscal	and	economic	conditions	(H1).	The	need	for	consolidation	is	
taken	 from	 the	German	Council	 of	Economic	Advisors	 (Sachverständigenrat,	2011)	
and	reflects	the	extent	to	which	states	need	to	consolidate	their	budgets	until	2020	
when	the	debt	brake	comes	into	effect.	
- For	bailout‐expectations	(H2)	we	exploit	the	survey	question	on	the	expected	conse‐
quences	 of	 non‐compliance	 (Figure	 3).	 From	 this	 question	 we	 construct	 an	 index	
which	captures	the	individual	perception	of	the	strength	of	the	budget	constraint.	A	
larger	 indicator	value	represents	the	perception	of	a	stricter	budget	constraint	and	
lower	bailout‐expectations.5		
- For	the	existence	and	stringency	of	a	state	rule	(H3)	we	merge	data	from	Ciaglia	and	
Heinemann	 (2013)	who	 develop	 an	 index	 for	 the	 stringency	 of	 German	 individual	
states’	fiscal	rules,	which	takes	account	of	the	rule’s	contents	and	precision,	legal	ba‐
sis	and	enforcement.	
- The	 insider‐outsider‐differentiation	 (H4)	 has	 two	dimensions:	 First,	we	 can	distin‐
guish	 between	 incumbents	 as	 insiders	 and	 all	 others,	where	 “incumbents”	 are	 de‐
fined	as	members	of	one	of	the	governing	parties	in	the	respective	state.	Second,	we	
                                                 
5 Indicator construction is as follows: We add one point if a politician expects one of the “tough” reactions to a 
state non-complying (i.e. “enforcement through constitutional courts”, “sanctions”, “intervention in budget au-
tonomy” or “merger of states”) and subtract one point for each of these reactions which is not expected. Analo-
gously, we subtract one point for each of the expected “soft” reactions to a state-non complying (i.e. “change of 
constitution”, “transfers” or “nothing”) and add one point for each of these reaction which is not expected. 
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can	compare	the	expectations	for	a	specific	state’s	compliance	between	in‐state		and	
out‐of‐state	legislators.	We	include	both	dimensions	in	our	testing.	
We	enrich	 this	 theory‐guided	choice	of	variables	 through	the	 inclusion	of	 further	 indi‐
vidual	 and	 state	 controls	 because	 a	 growing	 empirical	 literature	 points	 to	 the	 im‐
portance	of	these	variables	for	economic,	monetary	and	fiscal	performance	(Besley	et	al.,	
2011,	 Göhlmann	 and	 Vaubel,	 2007,	Moessinger,	 2014).	We	 take	 account	 of	 the	 politi‐
cian’s	 gender,	 age,	 education	 (tertiary	 degree,	 type	 of	 degree,	 such	 as	 in	 busi‐
ness/economics),	role	in	parliament	(membership	in	budget	committee)	and	experience	
(number	of	years	in	parliament).	Inter	alia,	these	variables	proxy	differences	in	the	indi‐
vidual	information	level.	Furthermore,	we	add	party	dummies	to	allow	for	the	impact	of	
ideology.	 Ideology	 might	 influence	 expectations	 since	 perceptions	 of	 economic	 con‐
straints	can	be	biased	by	strong	ideological	positions	(see,	for	example,	Heinemann	and	
Janeba,	2011,	for	the	perception	of	globalization	constraint	on	tax	policy).		Among	state	
controls	we	include	a	dummy	for	those	states	receiving	consolidation	aid	and	the	extent	
of	fiscal	equalization	transfers	received.	These	variables	cover	transfer	dependency.	Fi‐
nally,	we	add	a	dummy	for	the	political	orientation	of	the	incumbent	government	which	
allows	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 incumbent’s	 political	 orientation	 has	 an	 impact	 on	
compliance	expectations	for	the	respective	state.	
	
4.1	Baseline	results	
We	 estimate	 a	 probit	 model	 with	 the	 compliance	 expectation	 as	 dependent	 variable	
(dummy	equals	1:	Politician	expects	a	state	to	comply	with	the	debt	brake	as	of	2020;	0:	
expect	a	state	not	to	comply).	Since	we	have	expectations	of	639	politicians	on	16	states	
we	can	exploit	a	total	of	10,224	observations.	We	cluster	standard	errors	for	state	pairs.	
Column	(1)	 in	Table	3	summarizes	our	starting	point	with	the	full	set	of	control	varia‐
bles.	The	results	 show	that	 compliance	expectations	are	 related	both	 to	 the	 individual	
and	own	state	characteristics	of	respondents.	We	include	fixed	effects	for	MSPs’	states	of	
origin	to	account	for	the	possibility	that	politicians	of	particular	states	may	be	more	or	
less	optimistic	in	general	(as	it	is	suggested	by	the	descriptive	analysis,	see	Table	A2	in	
the	appendix).	
All	proxies	related	 to	our	 four	hypotheses	are	highly	 significant.	 Signs	are	 in	 line	with	
the	theoretical	expectations	for	the	H1‐,	H2‐	and	H3‐related	indicators:	Compliance	ex‐
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pectations	for	states	with	unfavorable	starting	positions	(lower	GDP	per	capita	or	larger	
need	for	consolidation)	are	less	optimistic.	The	belief	in	bailout‐transfers	or	other	relax‐
ations	of	 the	 fiscal	rule	(lower	 index	 for	strength	of	budget	constraint)	 lowers	compli‐
ance	expectations.	A	stricter	state‐individual	fiscal	rule	is	correlated	with	a	more	favora‐
ble	view	for	this	particular	state.	The	size	of	the	effects	is	substantial	judged	on	the	basis	
of	 average	marginal	 effects:	A	one	percentage	point	 increase	of	 a	 state’s	 consolidation	
need	(H1)	lowers	the	probability	that	this	state	is	expected	to	be	compliant	by	about	10	
percentage	points.	The	difference	between	a	very	soft	 (‐7)	and	very	hard	(+7)	percep‐
tion	of	 the	budget	constraint	 (H2)	amounts	 to	an	 impact	of	24	percentage	points.	And	
the	difference	 between	 the	weakest	 (0.45)	 and	 strongest	 (0.78)	 observable	 state	 debt	
rule	(H3)	is	associated	with	a	probability	increase	of	16	percentage	points	that	a	state	is	
predicted	to	comply.6	H4‐related	proxies	are	highly	significant	for	both	insider‐outsider‐
dimensions:	 Insiders	 (members	 of	 parties	 who	 form	 a	 state’s	 government/in‐state‐
politicians)	are	more	optimistic	than	outsiders	(members	of	opposition	parties/out‐of‐
state‐MSPs).	 The	 size	 of	 the	 effect	 is	 much	 larger	 for	 the	 in‐state	 vs.	 out‐of‐state‐
dimension	 (21	 percentage	 points)	 than	 for	 the	 government‐opposition‐distinction	 (4	
percentage	points).	In	the	light	of	our	theory,	the	positive	sign	of	insider	status	points	to	
the	 role	 of	 overconfidence	 as	 driving	 insider‐outsider‐asymmetry.	 If	 outsiders	 had	 an	
information	disadvantage	 they	 should	 sometimes	 over‐	 and	 sometimes	underestimate	
the	competence	of	insiders	but	not	necessarily	be	systematically	more	pessimistic	than	
insiders.	 Therefore,	 the	 systematically	 larger	 optimism	 of	 insiders	 is	 consistent	 with	
over‐confidence	rather	than	with	noisy	information.		
The	other	control	variables	are	 important	 to	understand	the	heterogeneity	of	expecta‐
tions,	 as	 well.	 The	 observed	 education	 characteristics	 do	 not	 show	 up	 significantly.	
Members	of	 the	budget	committee	view	adherence	to	the	debt	brake	as	more	difficult.	
Equally,	a	longer	parliamentary	experience	reduces	compliance	expectation.	This	finding	
is	not	driven	by	an	age	effect	which	points	into	the	opposite	direction	with	older	mem‐
bers	being	more	confident.	Female	legislators	are	more	pessimistic	than	their	male	col‐
leagues.	Party	imprint	on	compliance	expectations	is	moderate:	For	example,	there	are	
no	significant	differences	between	parties	from	the	opposite	ends	of	the	political	spec‐
                                                 
6 (0.78-0.45)*49 = 16 where 0.78 is the largest observed value of the index and 0.45 is the smallest observed 
value. 
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trum	 (i.e.	 between	 the	market‐liberal	 FDP	 and	 the	 socialist	 Left	 Party).7	 States	with	 a	
government	 consisting	 of	 right	 parties	 (i.e.	 Christian	Democrats	 and/or	 FDP)	 are	 per‐
ceived	to	have	a	higher	chance	of	compliance.	Consolidation	aid	does	not	seem	to	com‐
pensate	 for	 the	 less	 favorable	economic	and	 fiscal	 conditions	of	 the	 five	 related	 states	
since	the	related	dummy	is	significantly	negative.		
We	employ	various	model	variants:	In	column	(2)	we	allow	for	individual	fixed	effects.8	
This	specification	accounts	 for	 the	risk	 that	unobserved	 individual	characteristics	may	
bias	 the	 results	 for	 state	 indicators.	 No	 substantial	 differences	 emerge.	 Table	 4	 takes	
account	of	the	spatial	dimension	of	our	cross‐state	analysis.	 In	particular,	we	allow	for	
more	differentiated	information	asymmetries	across	states.	For	that	purpose,	we	include	
two	measures	of	 geographic	proximity	between	states:	First	 the	distance	between	 the	
own	state’s	capital	and	that	of	the	state	to	be	assessed	and	second	a	dummy	for	a	com‐
mon	border.	The	hypothesis	is	that	proximity	and	a	common	border	matter	for	mutual	
information.	Again,	column	(1)	includes	our	full	set	of	individual	controls	while	column	
(2)	replaces	them	by	individual	fixed	effects.	Only	the	distance	indicator	is	(weakly)	sig‐
nificant	in	the	individual	fixed	effects	specifications.	Compliance	expectations	tend	to	be	
more	optimistic	for	more	distant	states	than	for	close	neighbors.	This	is	in	line	with	the	
prediction	of	 the	theoretical	model	with	respect	 to	 information	asymmetries.	All	other	
results	hardly	change,	neither	in	terms	of	significance	nor	in	the	size	of	marginal	effects.	
	
4.2	Robustness	of	regression	results	
First,	 the	results	presented	above	are	robust	with	respect	to	the	use	of	different	varia‐
bles	capturing	state	fiscal	conditions	(Hypothesis	1).	No	matter	whether	we	include	ei‐
ther	a	state’s	total	debt	stock	relative	to	its	GDP	or	the	average	budget	deficit	(over	the	
last	three	years)	relative	to	GDP	instead	of	the	need	for	consolidation,	our	above	findings	
are	confirmed	(see	Table	A3	 in	 the	Appendix).	 Just	 like	 the	need	 for	 consolidation	 the	
debt	 stock	 and	 the	 average	 deficit	 enter	 highly	 significantly	 and	with	 a	 negative	 sign.	
Higher	debt	or	deficits	also	decrease	the	compliance	expectations	of	legislators.	The	im‐
pact	of	almost	all	other	variables	remains	as	in	the	baseline	regressions.	The	coefficient	
for	 GDP	 per	 capita	 becomes	 significant,	 thereby	 providing	 additional	 evidence	 for	 the	
                                                 
7 Weighted regressions, however, indicate that Left Party politicians are more confident that the debt brake will 
be respected than politicians from the FDP, see below section 4.2. 
8 Due to perfect collinearity of individual and home state fixed effects, we have to exclude the latter in this speci-
fication. 
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validity	of	a	more	general	formulation	of	hypothesis	1:	The	higher	the	income	per	inhab‐
itant,	the	less	financially	constrained	is	a	state	and	the	higher	the	probability	of	compli‐
ance.	 Only	 the	 coefficients	 to	 the	 fiscal	 equalization	 transfers	 change	 significance	 and	
signs	across	specifications.	We	belief	 that	this	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	debt	 is	
highly	 correlated	with	 financial	 equalization	 transfers9,	whereas	 the	 average	 deficit	 is	
not.	
Second,	a	concern	about	the	validity	of	our	data	could	originate	from	sample	selection.	
For	our	survey,	Heinemann	et	al.	 (2013)	have	conducted	a	unit	non‐response	analysis.	
They	make	use	of	data	on	the	personal	characteristics	for	all	1683	legislators,	not	only	
those	who	responded.10	The	non‐response	analysis	identifies	variables	at	the	individual	
and	state	level	that	affect	politicians’	participation	decision.	According	to	these	results,	
significant	drivers	of	survey	participation	are:	education	(degree	in	economics	or	busi‐
ness),	budget	committee	membership,	membership	in	government	coalition	parties	and	
gender.	Thus,	 our	 regressions	 comprise	 as	 controls	 those	 factors	which	are	 important	
drivers	 of	 non‐response.	 This	 greatly	 reduces	 the	 potential	 for	 selection	 bias.	 Yet,	we	
cannot	 fully	 exclude	 that	 we	 might	 still	 have	 a	 selection	 bias	 (Little	 and	 Vartivarian,	
2005).	As	a	 further	robustness	check,	we	therefore	employ	a	weighted	regression	(see	
Table	A4	 in	 the	appendix).	For	 the	weighting,	we	use	 the	 inverse	response	probability	
based	on	party	and	state	affiliation.	The	weighted	regression	slightly	changes	the	find‐
ings	 for	 party	 dummies:	 The	 Social	 Democrats	 dummy	 loses	 significance	whereas	 the	
difference	between	the	Left	Party	and	the	Free	Democrats	now	becomes	significant.	In‐
terestingly,	 in	 this	 regression	variant	 left‐	 leaning	politicians	are	more	optimistic	 than	
their	 right‐leaning	 colleagues.	 The	 essential	 findings	 for	 our	 key	 hypotheses	 are	 con‐
firmed.	Compared	to	the	non‐weighted	regression	there	are	only	minor	changes	 in	the	
size	of	average	marginal	effects.	
		
 	
                                                 
9 The correlation coefficient amounts to 0.76. 
10 We do not face severe item non-response but predominantly unit non-response. Item non-response amounts to 
less than 1% of respondents and is therefore negligible for the survey at hand.   
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Table	3: Likelihood	of	State’s	Compliance	–	Results	Excluding	Geographic	Proximity	
Probit	regressions	with	compliance	expectation as	dependent	variable (1:	compliance	expected,	0:	not	expected)
		 (1) (2)
Independent	Variables	 Baseline	1	
Average	
marginal	
effects	 Baseline	2	
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Individidual:	education	 	
Tertiary	degree	 0.020 0.006	 	
[0.035]	 [0.009]	 	 	
Economics/Business	degree 0.040 0.011	 	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Individual:	parliamentary	role 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.149*** 0.040***	 	
[0.046]	 [0.013]	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee ‐0.150*** ‐0.041***	 	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.006** ‐0.002**	 	
[0.002]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	other	 	
Female	 ‐0.106*** ‐0.029***	 	
[0.032]	 [0.009]	 	 	
Age	in	years	 0.002* 0.001*	 	
[0.001]	 [0.000]	 	 	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2) 0.063*** 0.017***	 	
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.112 ‐0.030	 	
[0.068]	 [0.019]	 	 	
SPD	 ‐0.181** ‐0.049**	 	
	 [0.074]	 [0.020]	 	 	
Green	Party	 0.050 0.013	 	
	 [0.087]	 [0.024]	 	 	
Left	Party	 0.109 0.030	 	
[0.084]	 [0.023]	 	 	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.109 ‐0.030	 	
[0.125]	 [0.034]	 	 	
State	characteristicsb	 	
GDP	per	capita	(H1)	 0.007 0.002	 0.005	 0.001
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.007]	 [0.001]	
Need	for	consolidation	(H1)	 ‐0.386*** ‐0.105***	 ‐0.541***	 ‐0.098***
	 [0.048]	 [0.013]	 [0.063]	 [0.011]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 1.860*** 0.506***	 2.736***	 0.497***
	 [0.292]	 [0.079]	 [0.398]	 [0.072]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐0.767*** ‐0.209***	 ‐1.220***	 ‐0.222***
[0.110]	 [0.030]	 [0.147]	 [0.027]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 ‐0.067 ‐0.018	 ‐0.151**	 ‐0.027**
	 [0.047]	 [0.013]	 [0.070]	 [0.013]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.605*** 0.165***	 0.870***	 0.158***
[0.074]	 [0.020]	 [0.103]	 [0.018]	
Cross	state	dimension:	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.759*** 0.207***	 1.121***	 0.204***
	 [0.104]	 [0.028]	 [0.169]	 [0.030]	
Distance	 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐	 ‐‐
	 	 	 	 	
Adjacency	 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐	 ‐‐
	 	 	 	 	
Home	state	fixed	effects	   	
Person	fixed	effects	 	 
Regression	diagnostics:	 	
Observations	 10,224 10,224
Pseudo‐R2	 0.243 0.491
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	variables	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	individual	variables 0.000 n.a.
p‐value	joint	significance	of	party‐dummies	 0.000 n.a.
p‐value	joint	significance	of	state	controls	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	cross	state	variables n.a. n.a.
Notes:	*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level;	Standard	errors	in	brackets;	a	base	category	is	the	market	
oriented	liberal	democratic	party	“FDP”;	b	State	characteristics	are	2010	data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	
place	in	2011,	and	2011	data	for	survey	wave	3,	which	took	place	in	2012.		
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Table	4: Likelihood	of	State’s	Compliance	–	Results	Including	Geographic	Proximity	
Probit	regressions	with	compliance	expectation	as dependent	variable	(1:	compliance	expected,	0:	not	expected)
		 (1) (2)
Independent	Variables	 Baseline	1	
Average	
marginal	
effects	 Baseline	2	
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Individidual:	education	 	
Tertiary	degree	 0.021 0.006	 	
[0.035]	 [0.009]	 	 	
Economics/Business	degree 0.039 0.011	 	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Individual:	parliamentary	role 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.148*** 0.040***	 	
[0.046]	 [0.012]	 	 	
Member	of	budget	committee ‐0.150*** ‐0.041***	 	
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 	 	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.006** ‐0.002**	 	
	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	other	 	
Female	 ‐0.105*** ‐0.029***	 	
[0.032]	 [0.009]	 	 	
Age	in	years	 0.002* 0.001*	 	
[0.001]	 [0.000]	 	 	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2) 0.063*** 0.017***	 	
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.112 ‐0.030	 	
[0.069]	 [0.019]	 	 	
SPD	 ‐0.181** ‐0.049**	 	
	 [0.074]	 [0.020]	 	 	
Green	Party	 0.050 0.014	 	
	 [0.087]	 [0.024]	 	 	
Left	Party	 0.108 0.029	 	
[0.084]	 [0.023]	 	 	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.107 ‐0.029	 	
[0.126]	 [0.034]	 	 	
State	characteristicsb	 	
GDP	per	capita	(H1)	 0.007 0.002	 0.005	 0.001
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.007]	 [0.001]	
Need	for	consolidation	(H1)	 ‐0.408*** ‐0.111***	 ‐0.572***	 ‐0.103***
	 [0.048]	 [0.013]	 [0.064]	 [0.011]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 1.806*** 0.491***	 2.683***	 0.485***
	 [0.286]	 [0.078]	 [0.393]	 [0.071]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐0.723*** ‐0.196***	 ‐1.166***	 ‐0.211***
[0.112]	 [0.030]	 [0.150]	 [0.028]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 ‐0.045 ‐0.012	 ‐0.116*	 ‐0.021*
	 [0.046]	 [0.012]	 [0.069]	 [0.012]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.582*** 0.158***	 0.838***	 0.151***
[0.071]	 [0.019]	 [0.099]	 [0.017]	
Cross	state	dimension	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.621*** 0.169***	 0.940***	 0.170***
	 [0.129]	 [0.035]	 [0.197]	 [0.036]	
Distance	 ‐0.014 ‐0.004	 ‐0.010	 ‐0.002
	 [0.026]	 [0.007]	 [0.037]	 [0.007]	
Adjacency	 0.133 0.036	 0.217*	 0.039*
	 [0.083]	 [0.022]	 [0.119]	 [0.021]	
Home	state	fixed	effects	   	
Person	fixed	effects	 	 
Regression	diagnostics:	 	
Observations	 10,224 10,224
Pseudo‐R2	 0.244 0.496
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	variables	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	individual	variables 0.000 n.a.
p‐value	joint	significance	of	party‐dummies	 0.000 n.a.
p‐value	joint	significance	of	state	controls	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	cross	state	variables 0.000 0.000
Notes:	*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level;	Standard	errors	in	brackets;	a	base	category	is	the	market	
oriented	liberal	democratic	party	“FDP”;	b	State	characteristics	are	2010	data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	
place	in	2011,	and	2011	data	for	survey	wave	3,	which	took	place	in	2012.	
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5.	Conclusion		
Fiscal	rules	are	designed	to	influence	fiscal	performance	of	states.	When	a	fiscal	rule	is	
effective,	it	must	impact	on	the	expectations	and	beliefs	of	those	politicians	who	decide	
on	the	government	budget.	Our	study	of	the	new	debt	brake	in	Germany	reveals	an	im‐
perfect	credibility	of	the	fiscal	rule	and	points	to	highly	heterogeneous	expectations	with	
respect	to	sub‐national	compliance.		
An	essential	result	relates	to	the	asymmetric	expectations	of	insiders	and	outsiders.	This	
holds	 both	 for	 the	 government	 versus	 opposition	 and	 the	 in‐state	 versus	 out‐of‐state	
dimension.	This	result	might	be	considered	unproblematic,	if	the	governing	parties	and	
politicians	 in	 the	 state	 under	 consideration	were	 better	 informed	 and	 therefore	more	
trustworthy	in	their	judgments	than	outsiders.	Our	empirical	findings	based	on	a	theo‐
retical	 model	 point	 into	 a	 different	 direction,	 however.	 Insiders	 (in	 state	 politicians,	
members	from	governing	coalition	parties)	are	more	optimistic	than	outsiders	and	are	
likely	to	be	subject	to	an	overconfidence	bias,	which	could	lead	to	too	little	consolidation	
effort.	The	asymmetry	has	 the	potential	 to	undermine	a	 fiscal	 rule’s	effectiveness:	The	
prevalent	expectation	that	other	 jurisdictions	might	not	comply	could	also	weaken	the	
perceived	pressure	for	the	own	state.			
Our	analysis	allows	us	to	draw	a	few	tentative	conclusions	that	should	be	taken	into	ac‐
count	in	the	design	of	fiscal	rules	also	in	the	European	context.	First,	a	weak	initial	fiscal	
situation	is	a	burden	for	rule	credibility.	The	phasing‐in	of	a	new	rule	should	be	paral‐
leled	by	attempts	to	remove	or	at	least	reduce	the	problem	of	unsustainable	budgetary	
legacies	such	as	high	initial	debt.	Second,	sub‐national	rules	might	be	a	helpful	comple‐
ment	to	a	national	rule	in	a	federal	context	like	Germany	where	states	have	substantial	
spending	and	deficit	autonomy.	And	third,	clear	and	comprehensive	sanctions	and	con‐
sequences	in	case	of	non‐compliance	are	important	to	anchor	compliance	expectations.		
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Appendix	A.	Tables	
	
Table	A1:	Individual	and	State	Variables	
Variable	 Unit	 Explanations
	 	
Individual:	education	
Tertiary	degree	 Dummy	 Degree	from	university	or	polytechnic	
Economics/Business	degree	 Dummy	 Tertiary	education	in	business	or	economics	
	 	
Individual:	parliamentary	role	
Member	of	governing	par‐
ties	in	state	
Dummy	 Member	of	one	of	the	ruling	parties	
Member	of	budget	commit‐
tee	
Dummy	 Deals	with	state	government	budget		
Number	of	years	in	parlia‐
ment	
Discrete	 Calculated	as	2011/2012	minus	year	of	parliament	
entry	(interruptions	taken	into	account)	
	 	
Individual:	other	
Female	 Dummy	 Member	of	parliament	is	female	
Age	in	years	 Discrete	 Calculated	as	2011/2012	minus	year	of	birth	
	 	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation	
Index	for	perceived	strength	
of	budget	constraint	
Discrete	 Measure	ranging	from	‐7	to	+7,	with	higher	values	
indicating	a	higher	expectation	of	the	debt	brake	be‐
ing	enforced	in	case	of	non‐compliance,	see	footnote	3	
	 	
Individual:	party	affiliation
CDU/CSU	 Dummy	 Member	of	Christian	Democratic	or	Christian	Social	
Party		
FDP	 Dummy	 Member	of	Free	Democratic	Party	
Green	Party	 Dummy	 Member	of	Green	Party
Left	Party	 Dummy	 Member	of	Left	Party	(not	included	into	regressions	
since	it	serves	as	base	category)	
SPD	 Dummy	 Member	of	Social	Democratic	Party	
Other	 Dummy	 Member	of	other	Party
	 	
State	characteristics	
GDP	per	capita	 Continuous Gross	domestic	product	per	capita,	in	thousands	of
Euros,	source:		German	Statistical	Office	
Need	for	consolidation	 Continuous In	%	of	GDP,	consolidation	needed	to	comply	with	
debt	brake	by	the	year	2020,	source:	Sachverstän‐
digenrat	(2011)	
Total	debt	to	GDP	 Continuous Total	debt	divided	by	gross	domestic	product,	in	%,	
source:		German	Statistical	Office	
Three	year	average	budget	
deficit	to	GDP		
Continuous Weighted	average	of	the	last	three	budget	deficits	
divided	by	gross	domestic	product,	in	%,	source:		
German	Statistical	Office	
Index	of	stringency	of	state	
debt	rule	
Continuous
	
Normalized	between	0	and 1,	larger	values	indicating	
stricter	rule,	source:	Ciaglia	and	Heinemann	(2013)	
Dummy	for	consolidation	 Dummy	 Takes	the	value	of	1	for	states	receiving	consolidation	
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assistance	 assistance
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	
to	total	spending	
Continuous Total	net	intra‐state	transfer	payments	divided	by	
total	spending,	in	%,	sources:		Federal	Ministry	of	
Finance,	German	Statistical	Office	
Government	coalition	con‐
sists	of	right	parties	
Dummy	 Takes	the	value	of	1	for	a	purely	right‐leaning	gov‐
ernment	(coalition),	a	value	of	0.5	for	a	mixed	gov‐
ernment	coalition	and	a	value	of	0	for	a	purely	left‐
leaning	government	(coalition)	
	 	
Cross	state	dimension	
Distance	 Continuous Distance	in	100	km	between	any	two	state	capital	
cities	
Adjacency	 Dummy	 Takes	on	the	value	of	1 if	the	home	state	of	the	re‐
spondent	and	the	state	to	be	evaluated	share	a	com‐
mon	border	(and	if	the	state	to	be	evaluated	is	the	
home	state	of	the	respondent)	
Own	state	 Dummy	 Takes	on	the	value	of	1 if	the	state	to	be	evaluated	it	
the	home	state	of	the	respondent	
	 	
	
Table	A2:	Cross‐state	compliance	expectations	
 
	 	 Evaluated	states	 	
	 	 BB	 BE	 BW	 BY	 HB	 HE HH MV NI NW	 RP SH SL	 SN	 ST	 TH ∅
Ev
al
ua
ti
ng
	st
at
es
	
BB	 53	 5	 68 89	 0	 58 53 11 37 16 32 5 11	 68	 16	 37 35
BE	 13	 33	 70 73	 0	 67 37 30 47 10 23 13 10	 57	 27	 50 35
BW	 5	 0	 75 93	 1	 58 22 16 17 9 19 8 4	 71	 5	 19 26
BY	 3	 3	 57 89	 3	 53 21 4 25 5 17 7 4	 61	 5	 32 24
HB	 11	 0	 67 72	 11	 56 28 28 50 11 28 6 6	 56	 28	 22 30
HE	 10	 2	 56 76	 2	 78 26 18 34 10 16 8 8	 58	 16	 32 28
HH	 21	 8	 72 74	 0	 62 67 31 44 15 36 8 3	 54	 21	 28 34
MV	 6	 0	 72 78	 0	 53 41 83 24 0 12 0 6	 78	 12	 29 31
NI	 4	 0	 74 91	 2	 57 24 19 56 11 26 11 6	 54	 20	 26 30
NW	 6	 4	 67 82	 0	 53 10 24 45 16 29 10 4	 61	 20	 31 29
RP	 14	 0	 76 78	 4	 64 28 20 36 14 52 12 4	 64	 22	 40 33
SH	 10	 7	 65 86	 10	 55 17 24 38 10 21 66 10	 52	 28	 31 33
SL	 20	 5	 95 100	 5	 85 45 20 55 10 35 20 30	 55	 25	 35 40
SN	 11	 0	 67 80	 2	 42 11 29 20 0 13 4 0	 89	 16	 42 27
ST	 24	 3	 76 83	 7	 52 28 45 35 14 28 17 17	 72	 59	 45 38
TH	 22	 11	 67 97	 11	 69 22 31 47 19 33 28 11	 89	 28	 47 40
∅MSP	
∅State	
12	 4	 69 85	 3	 59 27 23 36 10 26 13 7	 65	 19	 33 31
15	 5	 70 84	 4	 60 30 27 38 11 26 14 8	 65	 22	 34 32
#	of	times	
where	out‐
siders	are	
more	opti‐
mistic	than	
insiders	
0	 0	 3	 4	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	
	
Note:	Figures	are	in	percent	and	indicate	the	share	of	MSPs	who	expect	that	the	evaluated	state	will	be	
compliant.		∅MSP	indicates	the	average	over	all	MSPs.	∅State	indicates	the	unweighted	average	over	the	state	
figures.	
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Table	A3: Likelihood	of	Any	State’s	Compliance	–	Robustness	Checks	1	(alternative	var‐
iables)	
Probit	regressions	with	compliance	expectation	as	dependent	variable	(1:	compliance	expected,	0:	not	expected)
		 (1) (2)
Independent	Variables	
Baseline	1	
(with	total	
debt)		
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Baseline	1	
(with	budget	
deficit)		
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Individidual:	education	 	
Tertiary	degree	 0.023 0.006	 0.023	 0.006
[0.035]	 [0.009]	 [0.035]	 [0.010]	
Economics/Business	degree 0.038 0.010	 0.037	 0.010
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 [0.039]	 [0.011]	
Individual:	parliamentary	role 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.127*** 0.034***	 0.106**	 0.029**
[0.046]	 [0.012]	 [0.049]	 [0.013]	
Member	of	budget	committee ‐0.152*** ‐0.041***	 ‐0.149***	 ‐0.041***
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 [0.039]	 [0.011]	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.006*** ‐0.002***	 ‐0.006***	 ‐0.002***
	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	
Individual:	other	 	
Female	 ‐0.105*** ‐0.028***	 ‐0.106***	 ‐0.029***
[0.033]	 [0.009]	 [0.032]	 [0.009]	
Age	in	years	 0.002* 0.001*	 0.002*	 0.001*
[0.001]	 [0.000]	 [0.001]	 [0.000]	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2) 0.063*** 0.017***	 0.062***	 0.017***
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	
CDU/CSU	 ‐0.110 ‐0.030	 ‐0.103	 ‐0.028
[0.068]	 [0.018]	 [0.067]	 [0.018]	
SPD	 ‐0.177** ‐0.048**	 ‐0.167**	 ‐0.046**
	 [0.074]	 [0.020]	 [0.073]	 [0.020]	
Green	Party	 0.047 0.013	 0.046	 0.013
	 [0.088]	 [0.024]	 [0.087]	 [0.024]	
Left	Party	 0.103 0.028	 0.097	 0.026
[0.085]	 [0.023]	 [0.085]	 [0.023]	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.115 ‐0.031	 ‐0.117	 ‐0.032
[0.128]	 [0.034]	 [0.126]	 [0.034]	
State	characteristicsb	 	
GDP	per	capita	(H1)	 0.022*** 0.006***	 0.027***	 0.007***
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	
Total	debt	to	GDP	(H1)	 ‐0.053*** ‐0.014***	 	
	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	 	 	
Average	budget	deficit	over	last	three	years	(H1)	 	 	 ‐0.314***	 ‐0.086***
	 	 	 [0.034]	 [0.009]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 0.896*** 0.241***	 2.581***	 0.706***
	 [0.324]	 [0.087]	 [0.285]	 [0.077]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐0.100 ‐0.027	 ‐0.734***	 ‐0.201***
[0.117]	 [0.031]	 [0.094]	 [0.025]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 0.148*** 0.040***	 ‐0.315***	 ‐0.086***
	 [0.053]	 [0.014]	 [0.051]	 [0.014]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.145* 0.039*	 0.590***	 0.161***
[0.075]	 [0.020]	 [0.073]	 [0.020]	
Cross	state	dimension	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.627*** 0.169***	 0.731***	 0.200***
	 [0.106]	 [0.028]	 [0.129]	 [0.035]	
Distance	 ‐0.015 ‐0.004	 0.011	 0.003
	 [0.021]	 [0.006]	 [0.025]	 [0.007]	
Adjacency	 0.147** 0.040**	 0.136*	 0.037*
	 [0.073]	 [0.020]	 [0.083]	 [0.023]	
Home	state	fixed	effects	   	 
Regression	diagnostics:	 	
Observations	 10,224 10,224
Pseudo‐R2	 0.253 0.242
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	variables	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	individual	variables 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	party‐dummies	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	state	controls	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	cross	state	variables 0.000 0.000
Notes:	*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level;	Standard	errors	in	brackets;	a	base	category	is	the	market	
oriented	liberal	democratic	party	“FDP”;	b	State	characteristics	are	2010	data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	
place	in	2011,	and	2011	data	for	survey	wave	3,	which	took	place	in	2012.	
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Table	A4: Likelihood	of	Any	State’s	Compliance	–	Robustness	Checks	2	(Weighting)	
Probit	regressions	with	compliance	expectation	as	dependent	variable	(1:	compliance	expected,	0:	not	expected)
		 (1) (2)
Independent	Variables	
Baseline	1
(Weighted	
regression)	
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Baseline	1		
(Weighted	
regression)	
Average	
marginal	
effects	
Individidual:	education	 	
Tertiary	degree	 0.008 0.002	 0.009	 0.002
[0.039]	 [0.011]	 [0.040]	 [0.011]	
Economics/Business	degree 0.077* 0.021*	 0.076*	 0.021*
[0.042]	 [0.012]	 [0.042]	 [0.012]	
Individual:	parliamentary	role 	
Member	of	governing	parties	in	state	(H4)	 0.138*** 0.038***	 0.140***	 0.039***
[0.047]	 [0.013]	 [0.047]	 [0.013]	
Member	of	budget	committee ‐0.140*** ‐0.039***	 ‐0.140***	 ‐0.039***
[0.041]	 [0.011]	 [0.041]	 [0.011]	
Number	of	years	in	parliament	 ‐0.015*** ‐0.004***	 ‐0.015***	 ‐0.004***
	 [0.003]	 [0.001]	 [0.003]	 [0.001]	
Individual:	other	 	
Female	 ‐0.084** ‐0.023**	 ‐0.084**	 ‐0.023**
[0.036]	 [0.010]	 [0.036]	 [0.010]	
Age	in	years	 0.007*** 0.002***	 0.007***	 0.002***
[0.002]	 [0.001]	 [0.002]	 [0.001]	
Individual:	bailout‐expectation 	
Index	for	perceived	strength	of	budget	constraint	(H2) 0.057*** 0.016***	 0.057***	 0.016***
[0.006]	 [0.002]	 [0.006]	 [0.002]	
Individual:	party	affiliationa	 	
CDU/CSU	 0.000 0.000	 ‐0.001	 ‐0.000
[0.075]	 [0.021]	 [0.075]	 [0.021]	
SPD	 ‐0.125 ‐0.035	 ‐0.126	 ‐0.035
	 [0.082]	 [0.023]	 [0.082]	 [0.023]	
Green	Party	 0.037 0.010	 0.037	 0.010
	 [0.097]	 [0.027]	 [0.097]	 [0.027]	
Left	Party	 0.287*** 0.080***	 0.287***	 0.079***
[0.098]	 [0.027]	 [0.098]	 [0.027]	
Other	Parties	 ‐0.525** ‐0.146***	 ‐0.523**	 ‐0.145**
[0.204]	 [0.057]	 [0.204]	 [0.056]	
State	characteristicsb	 	
GDP	per	capita	(H1)	 0.004 0.001	 0.005	 0.001
[0.005]	 [0.001]	 [0.005]	 [0.001]	
Need	for	consolidation		(H1) ‐0.384*** ‐0.107***	 ‐0.393***	 ‐0.109***
	 [0.045]	 [0.012]	 [0.046]	 [0.013]	
Debt	rule	index	(H3)	 1.770*** 0.492***	 1.763***	 0.489***
	 [0.286]	 [0.079]	 [0.284]	 [0.078]	
Dummy	for	consolidation	assistance	 ‐0.733*** ‐0.203***	 ‐0.713***	 ‐0.198***
[0.108]	 [0.029]	 [0.112]	 [0.030]	
Fiscal	equalization	transfers	to	GDP	 ‐0.049 ‐0.014	 ‐0.034	 ‐0.009
	 [0.045]	 [0.012]	 [0.044]	 [0.012]	
Government	coalition	consists	of	right	parties	 0.578*** 0.160***	 0.558***	 0.155***
[0.072]	 [0.019]	 [0.070]	 [0.019]	
Cross	state	dimension	 	
Own	state	(H4)	 0.816*** 0.227***	 0.747***	 0.207***
	 [0.123]	 [0.034]	 [0.142]	 [0.039]	
Distance	 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.013	 0.003
	 	 	 [0.025]	 [0.007]	
Adjacency	 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.148*	 0.041*
	 	 	 [0.080]	 [0.022]	
Home	state	fixed	effects	   	 
Regression	diagnostics:	 	
Observations	 10,224 10,224
Pseudo‐R2	 0.235 0.243
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	variables	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	all	individual	variables 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	party‐dummies	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	state	controls	 0.000 0.000
p‐value	joint	significance	of	cross	state	variables 0.000 0.000
Notes:	*/**/***	denote	significance	at	the	10%/5%/1%	level;	Standard	errors	in	brackets;	a	base	category	is	the	market	
oriented	liberal	democratic	party	“FDP”;	b	State	characteristics	are	2010	data	for	survey	waves	1	and	2,	which	both	took	
place	in	2011,	and	2011	data	for	survey	wave	3,	which	took	place	in	2012.	Weighting	based	on	inverse	response	probabil‐
ities	based	on	party	and	state	affiliation.	
